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New vitality in procedural due process requires a fresh 
attitude and this article offers such an alternative. 1 Procedural 
development has evolved as far as possible with the current 
balancing approach whereby the "state's" interest is traded 
against that of its individual citizens. This new attitude starts 
with the recognition that the state is a reflection of the 
community it serves. In our society, the community has an 
overarching interest in the way it treats its individual members. 
The process whereby decisions are made reflects the community's 
commitment to fundamental principles as surely as do the 
substantive outcomes of those decisions. Procedural due process 
is thus a community imperative, and to approach it as a trade off 
1. Frequently cited authorities: 
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976). 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But 
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 
(1988). 
CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1997). 
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between the community and the community's individual 
members misconstrues the task. 
The first step is to move beyond ''balancing'' as the dominant 
strategy for procedural design. Balancing's instinct for trading 
important interests against each other starts procedural due 
process down the wrong analytical path. Moreover, balancing 
tends towards ad hoc decisionmaking in which prior learning is 
not easily applied to new tasks. In lieu of balancing, this article 
recommends a broader system of principles, whereby prior 
experience can be combined with empirical analysis and 
decisionmaking theory to guide a creative and dynamic evolution 
of general and specific procedural design principles. 
Unlike balancing, this system will be founded on an instinct 
to coordinate important values. It will be based on the 
fundamental common interests of the community and its 
individual members. It will search for procedural designs that 
optimize service to both the community's interests and those of 
the community's individual members. Coordination rather than 
adverseness must be the driving force. 
To guide the development of this coordinating system, 
various procedural design factors are interpreted to reflect the 
commonality between the community and its members. The costs 
and the potential effectiveness of a procedural design are of 
interest to both community and individual, and hence these basic 
factors are explored as they are fundamental to developing 
procedural designs that serve all interests. Both the community 
and its members are concemed about the substantive impact of 
such procedural designs, and that concem is reflected in the 
design so as to incorporate both categories of interests. 
Maintenance of the community itself is a fundamental goal 
behind procedural design, and this design must recognize that 
the individual members, particularly those directly affected by 
the relevant community program, are intimately concemed with 
the vitality of the community that serves them. The community 
depends on individual members' acceptance of its process for 
decisions, particularly the acceptance of those directly affected. 
Thus, the design must rest on values such as satisfaction, 
cultural imperatives and tradition, dignity, equality, and 
consistency. 
These factors offer points of sensitivity to be applied in 
actual procedural design. In application, as in concept, the goal 
remains to coordinate in procedural design the community's 
interests with those of its individual members. These factors 
then provide a context for the coordination of these major 
categories of interests. Thus, this article suggests three 
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application levels. At the most basic level, these factors 
determine the relative weight of the procedural design issues 
within the bundle of issues, both procedural and substantive, 
before the decisionmaker. Secondly, it suggests how these 
factors might be captured in categories of similar procedural 
tasks so that future procedural designs can take advantage of 
prior experience and study. Lastly, this article concedes that in 
application some interests may demand priority over others, 
but suggests that consideration of all the points of sensitivity 
will assure that concession to special demands will still 
optimize all interests. 
Because design will necessarily be affected by the designers' 
perspective, the design's application must include consideration 
of how those perspectives might manifest themselves and 
perhaps be adjusted by this approach. Here, it is recognized that 
while much of procedural-design thinking revolves around 
constitutional principles, learning is and should be applied to 
statutory and administrative procedural design efforts. Thus, the 
system of principles must guide designers primarily concerned 
with broad community interests, such as legislators or 
administrators, as well as those evaluating the procedural design 
in the context of an individual application-the courts. Here, the 
points of sensitivity should assure that both categories of 
designers understand the full range of values embedded in the 
procedural design and strive to optimize all of the interests at 
stake. 
Our culture demands that government, as the executor of 
community goals, treat its citizens fairly. This cultural 
imperative should drive procedural due-process analysis. The 
search is for a system that treats procedural fairness as an 
overarching community demand from government. Only through 
fair process can government serve community desires. Hence, the 
"state's interest" must reflect the individual interests of all 
community members. This article hopes to establish a system of 
principles that realizes this goal. 
I. THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE IN THE DUE PROCESS 
CALCULUS 
A. Context 
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution provide the fundamental source 
whereby judicial interpretation has evolved, especially in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, into a sophisticated procedural 
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jurisprudence. An explosion in procedural innovation began with 
the 1970 Supreme Court opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly.2 Goldberg 
created a new sense of property from which grew a "considerable 
progeny."3 Quickly, a "new" liberty interest was added to this 
"new'' property interest.4 Still, the principles for defining these 
new categories of due process interests needed development, and 
over the years the Court has engaged itself in the task of evolving 
a body oflaw defining the categories of interests protected by the 
due process clauses.5 
2. 397 U.S. 254, 261, 264 (1970) (holding that welfare recipients had a right to 
a full evidentiary hearing prior to a termination of benefits). The majority found that 
the benefits constituted "statutory entitlement[s,]" and that the termination 
decisions adjudicated "important rights." See id. at 262. The Court relied on two law 
review articles written by Charles Reich. See id. at 262 n.8 (approving of Reich's 
analysis). The first article cited by the Court was Charles A Reich, Individual 
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 
(1965) (arguing that all classes of citizens, save the poor, have their entitlements 
enforced in forms such as franchises, professional licenses, union membership, 
employment contracts, pension programs, and stock options). The second was 
Charles A Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964) (proposing that 
those receiving government entitlements should have a complete ownership right in 
the receipts). Thus, the property interest protected by the due process clauses was 
made to cover any entitlement or benefit provided by the government. 
3. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,» 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 
1273 (1975). A new cycle of interest in the procedures used by governments seems 
underway. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1973, 1988, 1989, 1991 (1996) (suggesting that a 
counterrevolution is upon us, in which due process coverage in the areas of 
prisoners' rights, welfare benefits, and social security benefits will be severely cut). 
But see Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution» and "Reform»: Procedural Due 
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 592 (1998) (rejecting 
Pierce's prediction). Comprehensive legislative consideration of administrative 
procedure also increased in the recent congresses with a variety of bills introduced to 
revise federal administrative procedure. See id. at 597-99, 618-20 (discussing the 
Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act). 
4. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) ("Where a 
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the 
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."). 
Although the broader sense of the liberty interest has become firmly established, the 
Court has constrained the most generous versions. See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (declaring that due process is violated when a state "imposes 
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (observing that an interest is 
protected only where "a right or status previously recognized by state law was 
distinctly altered or extinguished"). 
5. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (holding that 
notwithstanding the lack of an express contractual right to renew a contract, an 
employee may be entitled to a hearing if the rules and practices of the institution 
provide a legitimate claim to contract renewal); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 577 (1972) (finding that property rights "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law"). A new property interest depends on whether a standard must be 
applied before the action may be taken. To give the source of the interest its 
broadest possible connotation, it has ultimately come to be called a "substantive 
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The Goldberg expansion precipitated a second, and in many 
ways more challenging, inquiry into procedural design. As the 
Court observed immediately after Goldberg: "Once it is determined 
that due process applies, the question remains what process is 
due."6 That question presents a court with a wide range of 
alternatives.7 In the bedrock tum-of-the-century case of Londoner 
v. City of Denver, setting the foundation for the right to a hearing, 
the Court concluded: "Many requirements essential in strictly 
judicial proceedings may be dispensed with . . . . [A] hearing in its 
very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the 
right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if 
need be, by proof, however informal.',s In another classic due 
process opinion, the Court observed: ''The very nature of due 
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally 
applicable to every imaginable situation."9 The decision in 
Goldberg v. Kelly was criticized as retreating from this notion of 
flexibility and substituting trial-like procedures as a due-process 
norm.10 Soon after Goldberg, however, the Court reaffirmed its 
commitment to procedural flexibility in Goss v. Lopez.11 
Given the wide spectrum of legitimate procedural moves, a 
strategy was needed for determining what or how much 
procedure would be necessary for any given process. That 
predicate." See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at 79. This approach is not so uniformly 
applied in the search for new liberty. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), 
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the "substantive predicate" approach. See id. at 
483-84, 486 (limiting the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in a 
prison setting to circumstances that "impose[] atypical and significant hardship on 
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"). Justice Breyer, 
however, preferred to continue the approach unless the interest was so fundamental 
as to carry its own protection or so ordinary as to warrant no constitutional 
protection. See id. at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that a state must comply 
with due process if the state effectuates a severe change in condition, or if the state 
acts outside of its power). 
6. Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). 
7. See id. ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require 
citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands."). 
8. 210 u.s. 373, 386 (1908). 
9. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opining that due process is a 
flexible concept based upon history, reason, and democratic ideals). 
10. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1299-1301 (arguing that Justice Brennan, 
after first noting that the required hearing need not be judicial or quasi-judicial in 
nature, "demand[ed] almost all the elements of [a trial]"). 
11. 419 U.S. 565, 577-78, 581, 583 (1975) (declaring that although due process 
requires a student facing a suspension from school to be given notice of the charges 
against him and an opportunity to present his side, due process does not guarantee 
such a student access to a judicial-like proceeding, whereby the student may have 
counsel, or call or cross-examine witnesses). 
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mechanism was provided by Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews 
v. Eldridge.12 The Court was asked to measure the adequacy of 
the Social Security Administration's procedures for disability 
decisions.13 However, the applicability of the Due Process Clause 
was not contested.14 The Court faced only the question of whether 
the process was adequate.15 In answering this question, Justice 
Powell established a tese6 that has dominated procedural design 
ever since.17 He focused on three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.18 
The Court intended this test to be "intensely practical,"19 and 
it spawned a workable body of law.20 The Mathews test 
12. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
13. See id. at 323, 335. 
14. See id. at 332. 
15. See id. at 334-35. 
16. Seeid. 
17. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 554 
(5th ed. 1995) (observing that all courts must use the Mathews balancing test to 
determine if a government action violates due process). 
18. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
19. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992) ("Application of this 
balancing principle is 'intensely practicalO' because attention is directed to both the 
nature of the clainl presented and the characteristics of the particular 
administrative procedure provided.") (citations omitted). 
20. A recent example of a pure Mathews approach is Gilbert v. Hamar, 520 U.S. 
924 (1997). A campus police officer at a state university was suspended after a drug 
charge. See id. at 926-27. The charges were dismissed but the suspension remained 
in effect and the employee was demoted to groundskeeper. See id. at 927. The only 
administrative process afforded to the officer was the opportunity to tell his side of 
the story to university officials. See id. The Court balanced the employee's interest 
against the State's. See id. at 931-32. The Court found that the severity, length, and 
finality of the deprivation should all be considered. See id. at 932. Here, the Court 
found that the loss of income and benefits constituted a "relatively insubstantial" 
loss. See id. In contrast, it found that "the State has a significant interest in 
immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who 
occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility, such as police 
officers." Id. As to what it termed the "last factor in the Mathews balancing," the 
Court concluded that pre-suspension process was not necessary because the arrest 
and filing of charges against the respondent provided a reasonable basis for the 
suspension: "[T]he purpose of any pre-suspension hearing would be to assure that 
there are reasonable grounds to support the suspension without pay." Id. at 933-34. 
The Court, however, remanded the case so that the lower courts could consider 
whether the post-suspension process was adequate. See id. at 935-36. 
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implemented emerging perceptions of the legal process. 21 
Further, it added considerable rationality and structure to 
procedural design development, but still, it never quite "felt" 
complete or satisfactory. 
Mathews committed procedural design to balancing 
analysis.22 Although it lists three factors, the Mathews test rests 
on two sets of balancing maneuvers. One undertakes a 
cost/benefit analysis of additional and/or alternative procedures.23 
The other trades the "government's interest" against the "private 
interest."24 As Mashaw observed a number of years ago, the 
Mathews analysis is "implicitly utilitarian. "25 It creates a type of 
The Supreme Court has also used the three-part Mathews test to determine 
whether procedures comply with due process in private disputes. See, e.g., 
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 4 (1991) (holding that absent a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances and a bond requirement, states are prohibited from 
authorizing an ex parte, prejudgment attachment of real estate). The plaintiffs 
interests are substituted in the third factor and balanced against the defendant's 
interest with "due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in 
providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections." Id. at 11. 
The Court has also applied the three factor Mathews test in criminal due 
process cases. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 83 (1985) (requiring the 
state to supply a psychiatrist). The criminal process, however, is quite consciously 
unbalanced in favor of the individual interest even though community interests are 
quite compelling and do, of course, prevail in many cases. See, e.g., United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) ("We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent 
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial 
cost of exclusion."). Therefore, the following critique of the Mathews balancing 
approach may not apply in the criminal context. Although criminal procedure 
questions may benefit from the following analysis, this discussion is not focused on 
criminal procedures. · 
Of course, lower courts rationally apply the Mathews test. Some actually go 
through the three factors. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (declaring that neither the land use regulation nor the statute violates 
due process simply by permitting cancellation of a real estate contract without a 
hearing). 
21. Henry Hart had a tremendous influence on several generations' thinking 
about the "legal process." Eskridge and Frickey reported: "Hart ... pressed his 
students to think in cost-benefit terms: What is the objective, and is it socially 
acceptable? What means will fairly and efficiently achieve the objective? Is the cost 
reasonable given the value of the objective and the alternative means available?" 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 
HARv. L. REV. 2031, 2037 (1994). Can it be doubted that these teachings formed the 
Mathews mentality? 
22. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 994 (noting that Mathews is the foundation 
for modern due process analysis). 
23. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 39-40 (examining the Court's analysis of 
existing and additional procedural safeguards). 
24. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 ("Balancing opinions typically pit 
individual against governmental interests."). 
25. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 46-48 (arguing that Mathews is a utilitarian-
based approach that finds a due process violation "only when alternative procedures 
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social welfare function: "That function first takes into account the 
social value at stake in a legitimate private claim; it discounts 
that value by the probability that it will be preserved through the 
available administrative procedures, and it then subtracts from 
that discounted value the social cost of introducing additional 
procedures."26 This utilitarian balancing itself is one source of the 
unsatisfactory feel of the body of law that has evolved from 
Mathews. 
The cost/benefit approach promised a scientific foundation 
for procedural design, but it has never really delivered on that 
promise. To a large extent, the implementation of the 
cost/benefit analysis is unsatisfactory because there is little 
reliable information about the practical value of procedural 
elements. For this reason, this Mathews operation leads to a 
shallow analysis with judges making systemic procedural 
decisions based on personal experience, tradition or mere bias. 
While effectiveness must be part of the procedural design; and 
an attempt to guide its use is offered below, scientific 
foundation is not sufficiently developed to support conclusions 
about how various procedural designs serve one category of 
interest or another. Thus, the seemingly scientific measure 
becomes solely a matter of judicial guesswork.27 Absent the 
necessary support, these judgments may as easily do harm as 
good. This balancing maneuver is thus unsatisfactory because of 
the lack of solid information about the costs and the benefits of 
a procedure. This defect awaits the development of that 
information. Here, the analysis attempts nothing more than to 
incorporate the effectiveness question into the overall system. 28 
The deeper source of disquiet is the tendency of Mathews 
analysis to set state interests against those of the individual. 29 
The perceived juxtaposition of these two categories of interests 
has long been a part of due process jurisprudence.30 In the famous 
would so substantially increase social welfare that their rejection seems irrational"). 
26. See id. at 47-48. 
27. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1997) ("On 
balance, the value of such a hearing in insuring accuracy is low, while the cost of 
such a procedure is high.") (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). 
28. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1972) ("We now turn to the 
nature of the process that is due, bearing in mind that the interest of both State and 
parolee will be furthered by an effective but informal hearing."). 
29. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, at 554 (noting that the Mathews 
balancing test requires a balancing between the individual interests at stake and the 
government interests in avoiding burdens stemming from increased procedural 
requirements). 
30. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 (explaining that the interests of the 
individual and the government are often in opposition). 
644 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [37:635 
1961 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers opinion, the Court 
expressed: "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may 
require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a 
determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected 
by governmental action."31 Mashaw found this "calculus" 
inadequate because it ignores or undervalues some relevant and 
important individual values.32 The utilitarian approach, however, 
fails in more than completeness. As applied, this utilitarian 
balancing invariably pits the benefit to the individual against the 
cost to the community. Yet process has costs as well as benefits 
for the individual and benefits as well as costs for the overall 
system.33 
Because of these shortcomings, the Mathews calculus must 
be reconfigured so as to coordinate important interests. The 
"government's interest" in this calculus is important only in 
service to the community's interests and these interests of the 
community's members cannot be seen as adverse. The 
"government's interest" and the individual's interest should be 
considered in tandem rather than set against each other. 
Accordingly, this coordinating operation begins with recognizing 
that the Mathews "government interest" embodies the entire 
community's interests. This interest involves individuals' rights 
and hence incorporates into the Mathews calculus a 
responsiveness to all the interests bound up in a procedural 
design. Thus, whatever affects the community's interests 
necessarily affects the interests of the community's individuals. 
B. Breaking Out of Balancing 
Balancing is a flawed strategy for procedural design. 
Aleinikoff concluded the following from a sample case applying 
Mathews: "The opinion reflects both the dominance of balancing 
in the contemporary judicial mind and its emptiness as a 
methodology."34 Mathews balancing is not generally empty in 
31. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961). 
32. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 48 ("The Eldridge Court conceives of the 
values of procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural protections 
as enhancing accuracy, and thus linrits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow 
from correct or incorrect decisions."). 
33. See id. (arguing that utilitarian balancing neglects both the value to society 
inuring from proceedings and the costs to individuals for participating in the 
proceedings). 
34. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 983 (referring to Justice Stewart's opinion in 
Lassiter u. Department of Soc. Serus., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)). 
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actual application, but it can lead to dangerously insensitive 
analysis. In the procedural design context, the balancing strategy 
acerbates the tendency to set important interests against each 
other. These interests, however, are intertwined. Thus, a first 
step in enhancing the framework for procedural design begins 
with the realization that due process analysis must move beyond 
balancing and towards a system that coordinates valuable 
interests. 
Balancing involves a decisional process whereby interests or 
values are identified, evaluated, and ultimately measured in 
relation to each other.35 Balancing, properly employed, gives 
weight to all values. Generally, balancing may take two forms.36 
In one form, some interests are found to outweigh other 
interests.37 In the other form, each interest survives and is given 
some relative weight. 38 Even though some values are ultimately 
dominated by others in the first form, neither form denies values 
entirely.39 
Still, balancing suffers from its instinct for setting important 
values against each other.40 Although all interests should be 
represented when balancing is done correctly, the mental process 
of balancing ultimately leads to some sense of the relative 
importance of the competing interests. This attitude conflicts 
with the neutrality goal of procedural design.41 Procedural 
35. See id. at 945. 
36. See id. at 946. 
37. See id. ("Under this view, the Court places the interests on a set of scales 
and rules the way the scales tip."). 
38. See id. ("The image [under the second view] is one of balanced scales with 
constitutional doctrine calibrated according to the relative weights of the interests."). 
39. See id. at 945-46 (explaining that every interest implicated in a balancing 
approach is recognized, notwithstanding that in the first form one interest may 
outweigh other interests, and in the second form each interest is measured against 
all the other interests). 
40. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 59 (1992) ("Balancing weighs competing rights or interests."). 
41. Administrative law mantra decrees that unconstrained judicial imposition 
of procedure does significant harm. Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546, 548 (1978) (declaring 
that unless a regulatory agency fails to follow its statutory procedural guidelines, 
courts should not examine the perceived procedural defects because such intrusion 
would undermine the policy prescribed by Congress), with Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 
645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (directing that, when reviewing an agency decision, the 
reviewing court must look at the record to determine if "the decision was based 'on a 
consideration of the relevant factors'"), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Here, 
it is sufficient to suggest that thoughtful judicial concern for procedure, perhaps 
guided by some of the observations below, can be expected to make a positive 
contribution to the law. This is true because, unlike many substantive areas, judges 
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designers are led to net the individual's interest against the 
community's.42 Instead, they should recognize the commonality of 
community interests and those of its members. Procedural design 
should then coordinate those interests. 
The leading alternative to balancing has been 
"categorization."43 Categorization is an ordering whereby a large 
number of actual events are brought within a manageable 
system.44 In application, an individual case is decided by 
classifying it according to these categories and applying the 
preset legal rules.45 This approach leads a court to reason from 
differences of kind rather than degree.46 In judicial reasoning 
throughout our history, categorization has been an important, 
and often dominant, strategy.47 Balancing was not prevalent in 
Supreme Court opinions until the second quarter of the twentieth 
century. 48 Before balancing became dominant, the Court resolved 
clashes of interest in a categorical fashion.49 Today, however, 
categorization is seen as doctrinaire and stifling; hence, 
balancing has come to dominate modern legal decisionmaking 
theory, if not often actual practice.50 
have substantial understanding of procedural design subtleties. 
42. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61 ("Balancing requires the explicit 
articulation and comparison of rights or structural provisions, modes of 
infringement, and government interests."). 
43. See id. at 60 (arguing that strict scrutiny review for fundamental liberties 
and rational review for socioeconomic legislation are examples of categorical 
approaches). 
44. See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. 
L. & Soc. 3 (1980). Kennedy's "classical legal thought" seems the equivalent of what 
is termed here "categorization": "Classical legal thought was an ordering, in the 
sense that it took a very large number of actual processes and events and asserted 
that they could be reduced to a much smaller number with a definite pattern." Id. at 
8. 
45. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59 (noting that a categorical approach is 
"rule-like" in that it identifies classes into which factual scenarios fall). 
46. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 949 ("The power to tax was the power 
to destroy; states could exercise police power but could not regulate commerce; 
legislatures could impair contractual remedies but not obligations."). 
47. See id. ("The great constitutional opinions of the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional 
argument or justification."). 
48. See id. (noting that Justices Marshall, Story, and Taney resolved cases with 
a categorical, rather than a balancing, approach). 
49. See id. "Classical legal thought" of this long period engaged in "an objective 
task of drawing lines or categorizing actions." Kennedy, supra note 44, at 12. 
Although this decisional strategy of categorization may also be identified as 
"formalism," see id. at 5, categorization is not necessarily grounded in formalistic 
analysis. 
50. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 965-66 (arguing that because of its 
flexibility, balancing has become the "central metaphor for procedural due process 
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Although the modern legal mind seems most comfortable 
with justifications based on balancing, judges are as apt to rely 
on categorization.51 As Sheppard observed: "The Court balances, 
and the Court categorizes. Not only are both methods compatible, 
but both are now sufficiently entrenched as judicial tools of 
adjudication that the Court is unlikely to rewrite so much 
precedent merely because of a mode of interpretation.',s2 
A recent example is County of Sacramento v. Lewis.53 The 
parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a high speed chase 
with the police brought a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of 
the passenger's substantive due process right to life.54 The Court 
referred to a half century of cases identifying government 
conduct that "shocks the conscience.',s5 From these cases, it 
discerned "that the substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause is violated by executive action only when it 'can properly 
be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a 
constitutional sense.',s6 Explaining this test's application, the 
Court stated that "the constitutional concept of conscience 
shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, 
but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, 
only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability.,s7 The 
Court therefore went on to describe the content of the "conscience 
shocking" category and its foundation on governmental needs.58 
The Court then held: "Regardless whether [the sheriffs deputy's] 
behavior offended the reasonableness held up by tort law or the 
balance struck in law enforcement's own codes of sound practice, 
it does not shock the conscience, and petitioners are not called 
upon to answer for it under§ 1983."59 
More to the point, procedural due process analysis involves 
categorization in the first instance before it makes a move to 
Mathews balancing. The "new" due process analysis, recognizing 
analysis"). 
51. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 40, at 69 (observing that the Supreme Court 
Justices divided over the choice between "rules"-a categorization-based approach-
and "standards"-a balancing-based approach-in the 1991 term). 
52. Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional 
Balance Between the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 969, 975 
(1994). 
53. 523 u.s. 833 (1998). 
54. See id. at 837. 
55. See id. at 846-47. 
56. Id. at 847 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). 
57. Id. at 848. 
58. See id. at 849 (noting that unjustifiable, injurious conduct by a 
governmental actor is the epitome of"conscience-shocking" behavior). 
59. Id. at 855. 
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"new property'' and "new liberty'' interests, utilizes categorizations 
whereby the existence of a procedural due process right is 
determined by whether the interest involved is one protected by 
the due process clauses. These interests are protected because 
they are classified with those the Constitution designates for 
protection, not because a judicial balance has been struck in their 
favor. Goldberg did not change the well-established reliance on 
categorization. Indeed, Goldberg itself is based on categorization: 
trial-like procedures were required because the "entitlement" met 
the definition of "property.'.so Interests within these categories 
have been defined by the Constitution as sufficiently weighty to 
justify procedural protection without balancing them against some 
other value in the individual case.61 
Still, Mathews has committed procedural design to 
balancing. 62 Balancing is seen as a strategy for the objective or 
scientific development of the law.63 Yet practical difficulties in 
developing a principled measure of the relative worth of important 
values often overwhelm balancing efforts.64 Therefore, 
implementing a balancing strategy requires a scale of values 
external to judges, but such fundamental information is not 
available. A scientific or objective view of balancing surpasses 
reality. 
Actually, both the justification and criticism of the balancing 
strategy stem from its emotional, rather than scientific, appeal. 
60. See 3 KOCH, supra note 1, at 69. The debate over the definition of liberty 
interest in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) provides an example. Each of the 
Justices adopted categorization. See id. at 486 (holding that prison discipline via 
solitary confinement did not "present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in 
which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest"); id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that solitary confinement was such "a severe alteration in the 
conditions of D incarceration" that due process was violated); id. at 493 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (finding that prison discipline that produces a severe change in 
circumstances must comply with due process). Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the 
Court, distinguished the "intricate balancing . . . in determining the amount of 
process due" from the definition of liberty interest itself. See id. at 478. The majority 
held that the prison disciplinary decision at issue fell outside the definition of liberty 
interest because the decision "did not present the type of atypical, significant 
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486-
87. Justice Ginsburg, however, would have looked to the Due Process Clause itself 
for a definition. See id. at 489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also relied 
on a liberty-defining analysis. See id. at 493-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (propounding 
that solitary confinement deprives an inmate of liberty). 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
62. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 994 (noting that Mathews is the foundation 
for modern due process analysis). 
63. See id. at 960-62 (noting the parallel development of social sciences and 
balancing approaches). 
64. See id. at 973 (observing that one problem with a balancing approach is the 
absence of an analytic method for weighing competing interests). 
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On one hand, balancing presents some methodological 
opportunities that have suggested its utility to the modem legal 
mind. Balancing offers an opportunity for a judge to tailor the 
law for a particular litigation;65 it seems less abstract and more 
sensitive to individual circumstances. 66 On the other hand, 
balancing has been criticized as allowing judicial law-making 
based on personal prejudice and preference.67 A corrupt resort to 
the balancing strategy can be a tool for deceit and special interest 
promotion just as an honest employment of the strategy can 
illuminate sensitive comparisons of accepted values.68 While 
ideally, the freedom won through balancing assists the 
decisionmaker in achieving individual justice, this freedom also 
carries the opportunity for abuse. 69 
Balancing's adaptability to judicial policymaking is another 
aspect that fits the modem instinct for judicial activism.70 
Balancing permits judges to justify policymaking on the 
circumstances of the individual case before them. For broad 
policymaking, however, the very focus on the individual case 
recommends against balancing. Through balancing, judicial 
policymaking may be opportunistic in disregarding and 
modifying past approaches, but judges are also limited in their 
policy choices by the context of the case presented. In short, 
balancing fails policymaking because of its tendency to narrow 
perspective and its weakness in incorporating past learning. 
In contrast to balancing, categorization is seen as insensitive 
to changing circumstances and as a restraint on judicial 
activism. 71 Yet categorization can be extremely creative. It does 
affect, or one might say discipline, the mental process by which 
65. See id. at 961 (arguing that balancing approaches mimic common law 
approaches, thereby permitting flexibility and providing for gradual change in the 
law). 
66. See id. (explaining that balancing approaches usually involve an in-depth 
analysis of the particular factual situation facing the court). 
67. See id. (arguing that balancing approaches are susceptible to "unprincipled 
adjudication"); Sullivan, supra note 40, at 62 (noting that categorization reduces the 
potential of the decisionmaker to "factor[] the parties' particular attractive or 
unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus"). 
68. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 970 (asserting that a balancing method can 
be employed for honest or dishonest purposes, depending on the intent of the person 
employing the method). 
69. Refer to note 68 supra and accompanying text. 
70. Refer to notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text (discussing balancing's 
flexibility). See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that balancing methods permit 
treating cases that are substantively alike similarly). 
71. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 66 (proposing that rules are non-adaptive 
and thus sometimes become obsolete, whereas the flexible nature of standards 
permits adaptation to changing circumstances). 
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one evaluates or evolves ideas and this mental discipline has a 
natural tendency towards ordering. Still, this ordering generates 
its own creativity.72 Accordingly, this form of bounded creativity 
is a valuable strategy for procedural design. 
Categorization is dynamic as well as creative. It is quite 
useful for adapting to new circumstances and new social 
problems. Duncan Kennedy described the reciprocal nature of its 
developmental strategy whereby practice influences the system 
of premises and the system of premises influences practice. 73 As 
to categorization's operational strategy, he observed: "The basic 
mode of this influence of theory on results is that the ordering of 
myriad practices into a systematization occurs through 
simplifying and generalizing categories, abstractions that become 
the tools available when the practitioner Gudge or advocate) 
approaches a new problem."74 Categorization is a decisional tool 
that can incorporate all relevant values in the face of new 
circumstances without, as in balancing, setting the values 
against each other. The dynamic and adaptive, yet necessarily 
applied, aspects of categorization can serve procedural design. 
For this purpose, categorization must be distinguished from 
a strategy based on rules. Some see categorization as "rule-like" 
in that "[i]t defines bright-line boundaries and then classifies fact 
situations as falling on one side or the other."75 Rules are indeed 
applied in this fashion, but categorization decisions, as easily as 
balancing ones, "explicitly considerD all relevant factors with an 
eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or 
policies at stake."76 Categorization may, often better than 
balancing, "collapse decisionmaking back into the direct 
application of the background principle. or policy to a fact 
situation. "77 Thus, categorization can result in what some would 
call a "standard"-directed decisionmaking,78 but it is still a 
process that does not foreclose judicial discretion in making 
adjustments to fit individual cases. 
72. See, e.g., STEVEN JAY GoULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND 
THE NATURE OF HISTORY 98 (1989) (referring to taxonomy-the science of 
classification-as a "fundamental and dynamic science"). 
73. . See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 8 ("[Classical legal thought] is designed to 
tell us about the theoretical atmosphere within which practices occurred, and to tell 
us about the manner in which the theoretical atmosphere influenced particular 
results."). 
74. ld. (emphasis added). 
75. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59. 
76. ld. at 60. 
77. Id. at 58. 
78. See id. at 61-62 (opining that a rule is "simply the crystalline precipitate of 
prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way"). 
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Nor should categorization, at least the categorization 
referenced here, be confused with "formalism." Categorization 
may be seen as a kind of applied formalism.79 But unlike an 
extreme formalism that ultimately generates strict rules, this 
categorization disciplines, but does not inhibit, development. 
Indeed, this categorization, by demanding a continuing 
reworking of classification with each new "sample" dispute 
resolution, compels change and adaptation of general principles 
as well as adjustments related to the specific case. Categorization 
recognizes that theory without application is empty and that 
application without order creates systemic chaos.80 Experience 
and theory are necessary partners in any progressive evolution of 
both practice and ideas.81 This categorization is not slowly 
withdrawn from reality as the rules become more wooden with 
use, as might be seen in formalism.82 Rather, categorization 
orders a creative and dynamic decisionmaking process. 
Categorization broadens the perspective of the procedural 
design. In balancing, courts focus on the parties' rights and 
ignore or undervalue the interests of nonparties.83 Balancing 
leads a court to evaluate the various interests of rights holders 
without focusing attention on a complete set of interests.84 In 
conducting balancing, courts do not list all the interests 
potentially affected. To the point, for example, Aleinikoff 
observed that the Court in Goldberg made no effort to inventory 
the wide range of interests involved, nor did the Court disclose 
the basis on which it restricted its balance.85 As a generalization, 
Aleinikoff offered: "Taking balancing seriously would seem to 
demand the kind of investigation of the world that courts are 
unable or unwilling to undertake."86 Similarly, courts fail to 
79. "'Formalism' describes legal theories that stress the importance of 
rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly 
particular rules or quite abstract principles." Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 
45 U. PITr. 1. REV. 1, 9 (1983). 
80. See, e.g., GoULD, supra note 72, at 27-45 (discussing how early forms of 
biological categories or taxonomies were often based on a theory, such as creationism 
or the systematic increase in the diversity of life forms, but overlooked or 
contradicted actual data collected from the fossil record). 
81. See id. at 98-100. 
82. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1001 ("A nonbalancing approach ... does 
not require a court to be blind to the consequences of constitutional rules or the 
social context in which constitutional questions arise."). 
83. See id. at 978 ("In many balancing cases, ... courts make no serious effort 
to place the interests of non-parties on the scale."). 
84. See, e.g., id. at 977 (observing that the Court does not give weight to all 
possible relevant interests when performing its balancing approach). 
85. See id. at 977-78. 
86. Id. at 978. 
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justify in any objective sense the weight given to relevant 
interests or even to disclose the sources used in deriving those 
weights.87 Thus, the law created by balancing does not adequately 
develop transferable principles. 
Here, categorization has a clear advantage. It naturally 
searches for commonality. By ordering interests, it can provide 
solutions to similar problems. Through experience, categorical 
solutions are fine-tuned. Unlike balancing, then, categorization is 
progressive in that it is a continuous process of incorporating 
new learning and experience. Some of that learning might result 
from balancing, but it is still better captured as general 
principles by categorization. 
Furthermore, some observers doubt that values are 
sufficiently commensurate to validate balancing in many cases.88 
It may be deceptive to attempt to denominate rights in a single 
currency and weigh their relative worth. 89 The often subconscious 
realization that the interests involved are not actually 
comparable leads courts to camouflage the "intuitive" nature of 
their decisions with balancing justifications.90 Although 
procedural rights may involve a more manageable set of values, 
the commensurability of all those values remains in doubt.91 Even 
if Schauer is correct that rights decisions based on imperfect 
commensurability may still be preferable, the impediments to 
87. See id. at 976 (noting that, in its opinions, the Court sometimes fails to 
enumerate the analytical weights used to arrive at its conclusion). 
88. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796, 798 (1994) (arguing that incommensurability, which is an 
important part of law and society, occurs when "relevant goods cannot be aligned 
along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how 
those goods are best characterized") (emphasis omitted). The incommensurability 
debate is informative but generally beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Mathew 
Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169-70 
(1998) (defining incommensurability as the lack of a means of comparison among 
options or choices). 
89. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 973 ("The problem for constitutional 
balancing is the derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of interests into 
a common currency for comparison."). 
90. See id. at 975-76 (arguing that when courts attempt "to strike the 
unstrikeable balance," they resort to techniques such as using a vocabulary that 
creates the appearance of comparison, depreciating of one of the interests, and 
stating the problem in balancing terms, but actually deciding the case otherwise). 
91. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 896-97 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that the burden on 
interstate commerce of submitting to state court jurisdiction was not commensurate 
with the value of the local interests in reaching a defendant corporation that was 
beyond the personal jurisdiction of the state court). Justice Scalia urged that where 
rights are not commensurate, decisions should be left to the political authorities. See 
id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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comparison devalue the balancing enterprise in procedural 
design as in many others. 92 
Balancing conflates the procedural and substantive 
questions to the disadvantage of both. By pitting interests 
against each other, balancing tends to convert substantive 
questions into procedural answers.93 Goldberg was obviously 
really about cutting off welfare benefits; the more elaborate the 
procedures, the fewer denials or reconsiderations will be made.94 
The real motivation can be clearly seen under the procedural 
surface of Justice Brennan's opinion.95 Indeed, Justice Black's 
dissent challenges Justice Brennan's opinion, in that Justice 
Black believes that more procedures will ultimately mean fewer 
benefits.96 If the debate is about the most effective procedures in 
a given context, then balancing tends to misdirect the inquiry. In 
addition, if the debate revolves around the resolution of certain 
substantive social policy issues, then balancing interests to 
answer procedural questions is, at best, artificial. Categorization 
necessarily involves classification and, hence, better focuses 
procedural design tasks. 
The substantive policy implication of the choice of balancing 
over categorization is ambiguous. Many assert that 
categorization is biased towards social policy conservatism,97 
whereas balancing unleashes the courts to further liberal social 
92. See Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional 
Consequences, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 785, 806 (1994) (arguing that decisionmaking that 
holds rights commensurable to the greatest extent possible may still be valuable). 
Schauer propounds a kind of second-best argument whereby shutting down the 
analysis in the absence of perfect commensurability is inferior to founding a decision 
on even imperfect commensurability. See id. at 799. 
93. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1313-15 (discussing the courts' difficulty in 
defining the parameters of "some kind of hearing," which an administrative agency 
must provide parties in order to satisfy due process); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Block, 755 
F.2d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e cannot tamper with the administrative process 
simply because we do not like what is being done."). 
94. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (declaring that pre-
termination proceedings are essential to ensure that welfare recipients 'vill continue 
to receive their benefits). 
95. See id. at 267 (noting that welfare benefit recipients are protected from 
"erroneous termination of . . . benefits" if a hearing occurs before the benefits are 
terminated). Cf. Ewingv. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950) 
(deferring to Congress's decision that no hearing was required in an "administrative 
determination to make multiple seizures" of"misbranded articles"). 
96. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting) (predicting that the 
government will be forced to perform a thorough review of a welfare claimant's 
eligibility, and thereby delay or prevent some claimants from obtaining welfare 
benefits). 
97. See Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 320-
22 (1992) (opining that the categorical approach tends to produce conservative 
adjudication). 
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policies.98 While balancing facilitates change, it does not direct 
such change in any particular policy direction. 99 Categorization is 
conservative in the sense that once a category has been 
established, the status quo is protected because the revision of a 
category, given its generalized application, requires careful 
justification.100 Nonetheless, the established order may as easily 
be liberal social policy as not.101 Balancing may precipitate 
change but, as we see today, this decisionmaking freedom may 
move in any public policy direction.102 Hence, in the procedural 
design context, a court so disposed can easily weigh the balance 
to further either "conservative" or ''liberal" social policy goals.103 
In sum, procedural design must break free from balancing 
analysis and seek to coordinate the various interests through 
the evolution of workable categories. These categories will 
permit continual development and ready communication of 
98. See id. at 321 ("(A] rich consideration of all the relevant factors [through 
balancing] will naturally tend to lead to the expansion of individual rights because 
such an expansion is simply the moral thing to do."). 
99. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 960 (arguing that although "balancing 
facilitate[s] doctrinal change" by focusing on real world concerns, balancing itself 
does not necessarily determine a "liberal or conservative agenda"). 
100. See generally GoULD, supra note 72, at 98 (explaining that the science of 
taxonomy provides more than simple descriptions of categories; classification 
systems include the rationale or principle underlying the category structure). Any 
subsequent change to a category must therefore satisfy the requirements of that 
underlying rationale or principle. 
101. In the procedural design context, social policy choices are particularly 
confusing. Social policy liberals would be expected to support processes that enable 
government, and social policy conservatives would be expected to support processes 
that inhibit government. Yet the procedural choices of social policy liberals and 
conservatives have furthered substantive interests exactly the opposite of what 
might be expected. Social policy liberals have been strong advocates of a formalism 
that handicaps active government whereas social policy conservatives seem 
protective of active government. Liberal procedural choices, for example, Justice 
Brennan's view in Goldberg, see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (declaring that a pre-
termination hearing is required before welfare benefits are cut oft), inhibits social 
programs, as pointed out by Justice Black, see id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(predicting that the requirement of a pre-determination hearing before welfare 
benefits are cut off will result in fewer people obtaining welfare benefits), and 
conservative procedural choices, for example, Justice Scalia's view in Sandin, see 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that a state may prescribe 
solitary confinement without violating due process so long as the state does not 
create an atypical or significant deprivation of liberty), promote active government. 
102. Refer to note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1227 
(6th Cir. 1997) ("In our view, Defendants' interest in promoting the efficiency of the 
public service that the Board performs outweighs Plaintiffs' interests in petitioning 
for unemployment benefits."); Lange-Kessler v. Department of Educ., 109 F.3d 137, 
142 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that a statute regulating midwives was "rationally 
related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting the health and welfare of 
mothers and infants"). 
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learning about both specific and general procedural choices. 
Further, this strategy will neither mandate wooden decisions 
nor a particular social policy commitment. Rather, it will 
support a more broadly sensitive and progressive approach to 
procedural design. 
C. A New Attitude for Procedural Design 
The attitude generated by categorization best serves to 
evolve a coordinated procedural design system. A categorization-
type strategy has the advantage, consistent with the theme of 
this article, of supporting a system of principles that values the 
various interests involved in procedural design without trading 
them off against each other. While denying balancing's 
dominance, the system of principles sought here does not reject 
it. Procedural design must seek the advantages of alternative 
strategies, and the task is to find coherence in these alternative 
strategies. The search is for a system of principles, derived from 
the fertile caselaw and commentary, uninhibited by a 
commitment to balancing. 
Procedural design has been and was intended to be a 
dynamic process, 104 continually evolving in accordance with new 
experience and empirical data.105 The principles driving 
procedural design must remain flexible and eclectic.106 Moreover, 
the derivation of this system of principles must adopt Fuller's 
insight that "goals and means interact."107 Establishing principles 
is a dynamic process in which the principles are developing along 
with the innovations in procedures. Of course, while these 
principles cannot be asked to do too much, that they are not 
absolute does not mean they lack force.108 When the range of 
application is so broad and the alternatives are so global, the 
104. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("'[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances."). 
105. See id. at 162-63. 
106. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so 
often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands."). 
107. Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's 
Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433, 438 (1978). 
108. Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech" -Obscenity and "Obscenity": An 
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 903 
(1979) ("[A]bsolute in force is not the same as unlimited in range or scope. A 
principle or a right can be absolute when applied without being applicable to every 
situation."). 
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system of principles provides the pillars. Upon these pillars can 
be built the necessary body oflaw. 
This system of principles can be made to take advantage of 
both categorization and balancing. The system creates coherence 
by merging these apparently conflicting strategies into a unified 
decisional mechanism.109 This process begins by seeking the 
advantages offered by both methods.110 The drive to coherence 
finds force in one outstanding commonality: both systems value 
and evaluate interests.m The difference, as Sullivan observed, is 
that, "[f]or the categorizer, legal questions turn on differences in 
kind; for the balancer, they are matters of degree."112 Procedural 
design often needs to approach the question in terms of both kind 
and degree, or, at least, consider whether the question is best 
approached through analysis based on one or the other. 
Balancing contributes as a method of individual decision, and 
these individual decisions contribute to the body of experience 
that helps to develop procedural-design categories.113 Therefore, 
application of existing categories in particular cases will 
continually modify the categories so that they may adjust to new 
experience and future procedural requirements. 
In fact, balancing often evolves, especially in application, 
into categories.114 Categories are in some sense established, 
justified, and adjusted through "global balancing. "115 "Categoric 
balancing'' may, in reality, be seen as either balancing or 
categorization; the balance, once struck, is applied as categories. 
Indeed, exposition on or derivation of principles may look to 
balancing as well as classification.116 Even ad hoc balancing 
109. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 
HAsTINGS L.J. 825, 838 (1994) ("The dispute over categorization and balancing is 
miscast for three reasons. First, the methods are not often determinative. Second, 
the methods can often be translated into one another. Third, . . . the dispute is 
miscast because the decision between balancing and not balancing is illusory.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
110. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 973 ("[T]he discussion about whether the 
balancing or the categorical approach is better ... reflects a false dichotomy."). 
111. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 860 ("As it turns out, interests occupy an 
inescapable logical place in both [balancing and rules] systems."); Aleinikoff, supra 
note 1, at 1002 ("[T]here is no basis for the notion that non-balancing approaches are 
necessarily formalistic or unconcerned with the social context oflegal rules."). 
112. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 59. 
113. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1000 ("[T]o recognize a role for balancing in 
the extreme and rare case is not to demonstrate its validity as a mode of 
interpretation for the vast majority of constitutional cases."). 
114. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61 (observing that any differences between 
categorizing and balancing are differences of degree). 
115. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 978 (stating that "the Court usually appears 
to adopt a global balance, examining the interests on some classwide basis"). 
116. See Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor 
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would be too burdensome to decisionmakers without certain 
standards or limits on the range of issues for which balancing 
actually is to be employed.117 Sullivan concluded: "These 
distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and 
balancing, mark a continuum, not a divide."118 
Categorization, however, as the foundational framework for 
procedural design, shifts the inquiry's nature from an attitude of 
adverseness to an attitude of coordination and furthers the 
ultimate goal of optimizing all relevant values. It moves forward 
seeking a more sophisticated understanding of general 
procedural design principles as it guides application. 
Categorization also enhances the predictability of the procedural 
design system so that individuals and litigants will be informed 
as to the combination of procedural elements expected in a given 
set of circumstances.119 In short, procedural design will work 
toward objective guidance for procedural designers in specific 
contexts and in continuing to improve general principles. 
An attitude adjustment from adverseness to coordination 
will recast the due process factors discussed below as points of 
sensitivity. Attention to these points of sensitivity will optimize 
both community interests and those of the community's 
individual members. Thus, we come back to Mathews 
jurisprudence. Rather than merely approaching this body of 
thinking as balancing, we can see it as a mass of experience and 
thinking constantly evolving into a better understanding of 
procedural design. 
II. THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE IN THE MATHEWS FACTORS 
Mathews tells us that there are three types of 
considerations: the efficacy of the procedures, the interest of 
those directly affected by the decisions, and the "state's" 
interest.120 As suggested, this opinion has created two balancing 
exercises: a cost/benefit analysis of additional or alternative 
Schauer, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 813, 819-20 (1994) (arguing that weighing or balancing a 
value means "any form of reasoning or argumentation about the values in 
question"). 
117. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 855-56 ("The difficulties of balancing or 
'optimization' have also led scholars to define forms of 'bounded rationality' in which 
various rules of thumb substitute for fully comparative weighing of alternatives.") 
(footnote omitted). 
118. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 61. 
119. See id. at 62 (arguing that rules are fairer than standards because they 
prevent courts from arbitrarily factoring a party's particular "attractive or 
unattractive qualities" into a decision). 
120. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
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procedures and a trade-off between the state's interests and 
those of individual citizens. The first flounders on the absence of 
sufficient information about the various procedures' 
effectiveness, but is nonetheless a useful exercise. The second 
distorts, or at least oversimplifies, consideration of the values 
served by procedural design. Accordingly, a coherent and 
coordinating strategy will better serve procedural design. The 
search for coherence rests on the commonality between the 
procedural interests of the community and those of its individual 
members. Thus, the Mathews factors must be reinterpreted to 
maximize both interests simultaneously. 
A. The "Government's Interest" Redefined as the Community's 
Interest 
A closer look at Mathews supports a reading of the factors in 
tandem, rather than trading them against each other. Other 
foundational opinions such as the 1961 Cafeteria & Restaurant 
Workers opinion might be reconsidered in the same way. In 
Cafeteria, the Court may not have been asserting that the 
interests were adverse when it said: (([C]onsideration of what 
procedures due process may require under any given set of 
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise 
nature of the government function involved as well as of the 
private interest that has been affected by governmental action. "121 
As with the Mathews language, it is at least as easy to say that 
the Cafeteria Court contemplated consideration of these interests 
without trading them against each other. The task, then, is to 
demonstrate commonality between the interests of the ''state" 
and those of its individual citizens. 
"Government interest" is, of course, used frequently in 
substantive constitutional law questions and procedural design 
should be able to seek guidance from that body of 
jurisprudence.122 Government interest analysis, however, is so 
underdeveloped, sophomoric, and unsophisticated that there is 
no reason to consider transferring that learning to procedural 
design.123 Gottlieb concluded: "[T]he Court's treatment of 
governmental interests has become largely intuitive .... "124 
121. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886, 895 (1961). 
122. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 924 ("Regardless of terminology, most 
constitutional jurisprudence involves some overt or covert comparison between 
individual rights and governmental interests.") (footnote omitted). 
123. See id. at 932-35. 
124. Id. at 937. 
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Procedural designers must then develop their own sense of that 
interest. 
The first step is to reinterpret the term "government 
interest" as representing the interests of the entire community, 
and not just the interests of government institutions. The 
community exists for the individual. Community interests cannot 
be separated from the interests of individual members; nor can 
the interests of members be separated from the interests of their 
community. On closer consideration, the logic of setting the state 
against the individual breaks down. The community establishes 
programs to serve its individual members and charges the 
government with the responsibility to effect these programs 
fairly and effectively.125 When government fails, it fails both the 
community and its individual members, usually the former more 
than the latter. 
In the procedural context discussed here, the two interests, 
even if distinguishable, usually move in the same direction. The 
community interest is best served by processes that serve 
individual community members. Indeed, they gain strength from 
each other in most procedural contexts and, hence, the due 
process analysis should sum the community interests and those 
of its members rather than subtract one from the other .126 In 
simplistic quantitative terms, a judge who evaluates the 
individual interest as 8 and the community interest as 2 should 
find that the procedural question has a value of 10, not 6. The 
task, then, is to set the foundation for a procedural design system 
that coordinates these interests. 
Although the government's function is to carry forward the 
best interest of the greater society, its interests are distinct from 
the community's interests.127 Governmental institutions often 
have interests bound up in procedural questions, and the 
community cares about these institutions because they form a 
125. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Justifying Departures from Equal Treatment, 81 J. 
OF PHIL. 587, 593 (1984) (stating that an interest envisioned by the rational 
individual as a compelling state interest is one the government has a duty to fairly 
and effectively achieve). 
126. See Gottlieb, supra note 109, at 865 ("Instead of claims of right isolated 
from public purposes, the claims of right gain strength from those public purposes."). 
127. Jeffrie G. Murphy stated the following: 
Using Robert Nozick's metaphor, we might ... consider the matter in this 
way: If we think of the state as an agency that we might hire (at a cost in 
both money and liberty) to do a certain job for us, how would we write the 
job description? ... [A] state interest is to be viewed as compelling if and 
only if it is one of the interests or goals that one can properly imagine 
rational persons forming a government to achieve. 
Murphy, supra note 125, at 593. 
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significant part of the machinery furthering the community's 
goals. But the two categories of interest are not coextensive. The 
instrumental interests of government should serve both 
interests. Indeed, if governmental institutions are serving only 
their own interests, the governmental system is defective. 
Supporting the interests of governmental institutions may 
further the community's interest, or that of its members or both 
simultaneously, but the governmental interests that are relevant 
in the context of these overarching interests do not hold a 
premier place in the analysis. 
Setting the "state" against its citizens is not the 
Constitution's foundational perspective. Indeed, the founding 
society had quite a different vision of the relationship between 
the community and its members.128 This vision is captured in the 
incorporation of "police power" into constitutional law 
jurisprudence. Novak observed: 
"Police" in this sense stood for something much grander 
than a municipal security force. It referred to the 
growing sense that the state had an obligation not 
merely to maintain order and administer justice, but to 
aggressively foster "the productive energies of society 
and provid[e] the appropriate institutional framework for 
it."12 
In sum, government was envisioned by the founding society as 
serving the community and its members. 
On the other hand, the Constitution read as a whole requires 
a due process analysis compatible with the entire constitutional 
structure. Even mindful of the fact that both due process clauses 
came after the original text, and hence, might be seen as limits 
on existing structure, those clauses still cannot substantially 
compromise the overall constitutional scheme. For this reason, 
the third Mathews factor could be seen as a constitutional 
minimum. A court undertaking due process review must consider 
the impact on the other constitutional functions. As a part of the 
whole, application of the due process clauses cannot unduly 
interfere with legislative and executive processes and 
128. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in 
America, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 1061, 1070 (1994) ("[References in early Supreme Court 
opinions] suggest ... a vision that distinctly refused to separate public powers and 
private rights in favor of an over-arching notion of 'well-ordered' and 'well-regulated' 
community, in which liberties and powers, rights and duties were mutually 
interwoven."). 
129. Id. at 1084 (quoting Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the 
Development of Modernity in Seventeenth-and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An 
Attempt at a Comparative Approach, 80 AM. HIST- REv. 1221, 1226 (1975)). 
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responsibilities. It would seem to follow that a court that does not 
take this interest seriously slips its constitutional leash. 
Nonetheless, the sensitivity to governmental operations must, at 
base, become a sensitivity to the function of government in 
serving the community interest. 
The third factor in Mathews expressly refers to the 
government's interests, "including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail. "130 This third 
Mathews factor, however, is incomplete if confined to a concem 
for the governmental administration. In Cafeteria & Restaurant 
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, the Court expressed the 
true intent of this consideration as the "nature of the 
government function."131 It is not just the fiscal and 
administrative burden, but the totality of the govemment 
function assigned by the community that must be served. The 
institutional interests of the government, as such, must be 
given weight not for themselves, but as they relate to their 
underlying mission.132 The governmental institutions themselves 
have interests that may be indirectly related to their societal 
function, but in fact exist independent of that function.133 A 
maverick governmental operation may as likely-or more 
likely-be adverse to the community's interest as to the 
individual members' interests.134 Procedural design that serves 
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
131. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (emphasis added). 
132. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) ("Here, as in Love, the 
statute involved was enacted in aid of the Commonwealth's police function for the 
purpose of protecting the safety of its people."); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 
(1977) ("Far more substantial than the administrative burden [in drivers' license 
suspension proceedings], however, is the important public interest in safety on the 
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard."). 
133. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991) (criticizing a state's 
prejudgment attachment procedure that did not include notice). "[T]he State cannot 
seriously plead additional financial or administrative burdens involving 
predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an immediate post 
deprivation hearing." Id. at 16; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 155 
(1992) ("[T]he Bureau [of Prisons] has a substantial interest in encouraging internal 
resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by 
unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts."). The Court found, however, 
that this interest did not outweigh the failure to render medical care. See id. at 149, 
155. The process for driver's license suspension for failure to take a breath-analysis 
test was upheld because it assisted the state in criminal proceedings. See Mackey, 
443 U.S. at 18; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that 
there is a greater interest in protecting the individual's right to assistance in 
criminal proceedings than in the protection of public funds and, therefore, due 
process requires that an individual be given an adequate hearing before any welfare 
benefits are terminated). See generally Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
134. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 987 (observing two overarching limits on 
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the institutional interests does not necessarily serve community 
interests. 
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property provides a 
good example of a situation in which the government's interest is 
not the same as the community's interest.135 The case involved 
the need for pre-seizure process in a drug case.136 The Court 
recognized that the enforcement authorities had an interest in ex 
parte seizure, 137 but concluded that those interests were not 
strong enough in the law enforcement context to justify such 
procedures for real property.138 Clearly, drug law enforcement is 
very much in the community's interest. The community is, of 
course, also aligned with effective law enforcement. However, 
unlike the law enforcement officials, the community loses a good 
deal from having property tied up. The community interest, as 
well as the individual interest, supports great care in seizing 
property. Thus, both interests generally move the inquiry in the 
direction of greater attention to procedural integrity. 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court had 
difficulty determining the difference between the community's 
interest and the "state" or governmental interest.139 The Court 
recognized that care in taking a child from his or her mother 
was in the interest of the mother and the community/40 but 
found the government's administrative costs and the "State's 
pecuniary interest ... hardly significant enough to overcome" 
such important private interests.141 Yet the Court had not fully 
recognized the interests other than those of the individuals 
and the government.142 If it had, the "calculus" would have 
assertions of governmental interest: ''The interest may not impermissibly infringe on 
protected individual rights, and the interest asserted by one organ of government 
may not exceed the scope of that organ's authority."). 
135. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-56 
(1993) (deciding that the individual's interest-his right to maintain control over his 
home and to be free from governmental interference-is at odds with the 
government's right to seizure of the individual's goods). 
136. See id. at 46-47. 
137. See id. at 52. 
138. See id. at 57 (holding that personal property, unlike real property, could be 
removed to avoid seizure, and that prior seizure was unnecessary to preserve the 
court's jurisdiction over real property). 
139. 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ("Applying the Due Process Clause is ... an 
uncertain enterprise which must discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in 
a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by 
assessing the several interests that are at stake."). 
140. See id. at 27. 
141. See id. at 28. 
142. See id. at 31 (balancing only the individual's and the parent's interests 
against those of the "State"). 
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been much more complicated. Although the community has a 
strong interest in caring for children, it has a similar interest 
in protecting the family. Again, in a sense, although both the 
individual's and the community's interests were adverse to the 
administrative interest, the community interest also supported 
effective administration. Moreover, the community interest 
was aligned with both the child's individual interest and that 
of the mother. In short, a simplistic balance of the state's 
interests against the interests of selected individuals hardly 
captures the case's intricacies. 
A major source of confusion is the fact that the governmental 
institutions are left to assert and implement the community's 
interests. In the wider sense, procedural design cannot be 
insensitive to the operation of government. Indeed, concern for 
governmental operation may be a constitutional imperative. This 
concern, however, is relevant to procedural design only to assure 
that government properly serves the community interest 
entrusted to the government and not as it serves the government 
institution as such. 
B. Coordinating Community Interest and Individual Interest 
The enterprise of building a procedural design system 
demands that what has been expressed as the "government's 
interest" encompasses the full extent of the interests of society. 
Hence, there has been a shift to the term "community interest. "143 
From this step, the analysis moves to a rejection of the 
perception that individual interests and societal or community 
interests can best be treated as adverse.144 This step rejects the 
instinct to set the community against the individual as required 
by the balancing strategy currently used in the application of 
Mathews.145 These interests, as they affect the resolution of 
procedural questions, are interrelated. To set them against each 
other is artificial and ultimately endangers the full realization of 
both. 
The Court often understands the commonality of 
community and individual interests in the procedural context. 
Zinermon v. Burch provides one prominent example of 
143. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 981 ("The individual interest in 
communicating one's ideas to others may also be stated as a societal interest in a 
diverse marketplace of ideas."). 
144. See id. ("Balancing opinions typically pit individual against governmental 
interests."). 
145. See id. at 982-83. 
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procedural evaluation promoting both categories of interests.146 
Burch was taken to a private mental hospital after he "was 
found wandering along a Florida highway, appearing to be hurt 
and disoriented."147 The Court analyzed the problem without 
Mathews balancing. Instead, the Court looked to Burch's 
interests and the community's effort to help.148 The community 
wanted to help citizens in conditions such as Burch's, and Burch 
himself truly needed help. Both had an overarching interest in 
protecting Burch's rights and assuring that Burch was correctly 
treated.149 Indeed, ultimately, the Court needed to do no more 
than cause resort to procedures already available.150 Although 
balancing seems strange in the context of this case, Justice 
O'Connor criticized the Court for undermining the Mathews 
analysis.151 At base, the individual's interests and the 
community's interests were not adverse. Balancing of these 
nonadverse interests simply could not advance the analysis of 
whether the process used carried forward either's interest. 
146. 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990) (suggesting it is necessary to consider the state 
and individual interests as common interests; the state and individual's interest 
here were not at odds with one another in that both wanted to limit the power to 
admit patients). 
147. Id. at 118. 
148. See id. To some extent, the Court arrived at this analytical method via a 
rather abstract discussion of the application of the Parratt line of cases, see id. at 
128-29, in which the Court held that negligent or unauthorized acts cannot be 
subjected to the hearing requirements. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 
(1986) (finding that the Due Process Clause is not implicated by a state official's 
negligence, which causes harm to or destruction of life, liberty or property); Hudson 
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that the rule in Parratt regarding an 
employee's negligent deprivation of property also applies to intentional deprivation 
of property); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (concluding that the 
individual's loss could have been compensated by following state procedure and, 
therefore, the established state procedures did look to the individual's and the 
community's interests). 
149. See Burch, 494 U.S. at 122-23, 125. 
150. See id. at 137-38. 
151. See id. at 144, 147-48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Each of the Court's 
distinctions abandons an essential element of the Parratt and Hudson doctrines, and 
together they disavow those cases' central insights and holdings."). Yet Justice 
Powell distinguished Parratt: 
Thus, Parratt is not an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but 
rather an application of that test to the unusual case in which one of the 
variables in the Mathews equation-the value of predeprivation 
safeguards-is negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. 
Therefore, no matter how significant the private interest at stake and the 
risk of its erroneous deprivation, the State cannot be required 
constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process. 
Id. at 129 (citation omitted). Implicitly, at least, the Court differentiated the case 
before it in Mathews terms because it found that additional procedures were neither 
impossible nor valueless, see id. at 137-38, and that the individual and community 
interests were extremely compelling. See id. at 131. 
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In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the 
Court again coordinated, rather than traded off, these two 
interest categories in upholding the clear and convincing 
evidence test.152 In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court had 
ruled that life support could not be terminated without either a 
living will or clear and convincing evidence of the patient's 
wishes.153 The stricter evidentiary standard was justified, the 
Court said, because of the decision's importance for both the 
individual and the community.154 "We think it self-evident that 
the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are more 
substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those 
involved in a run-of-the-mine civil dispute."155 Thus, the 
community's interests and those of its individual members 
supported· each other and increased the significance of the 
procedural design. 
Procedural designers cannot proceed legitimately without 
careful attention to the interests of the whole community. In a 
developed society, the community cannot be said to gain other 
than through its individual members, and its individual 
members cannot be said to gain other than through the 
community. Nothing demonstrates this fact more clearly than the 
context in which most of the procedural due process cases arise-
administration of programs the community establishes to benefit 
the very group of individuals served by the procedural design. In 
this context, a procedural design cannot logically favor the 
community at the expense of these individuals; such an assertion 
is a non sequitur. 
There are, of course, conflicts among interests. For example, 
some individuals within the community are no doubt adverse to 
each other. The community interest equals the sum of the 
individual interests and thus, optimizing the community interest, 
necessarily involves the trade-off among the interests of 
individual community members. Distributions within the 
community raise society's most difficult and controversial 
questions. How process resources are distributed is a derivative 
of these questions. The community's procedures determine how it 
will mediate the conflicts among its members, but it is not truly 
152. 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990). The Court in FDIC v. Mallen found that both 
the community and the individual had an interest in assuring that the government 
does not act in haste. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 243 (1988). 
153. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284. 
154. See id. at 277-78, 280-81 (holding that an issue of "such magnitude and 
importance" justifies Missouri's requirement of showing clear and convincing 
evidence). 
155. Id. at 283. 
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adverse to any of those members. The community, however, 
seeks resolutions that are best for it, and individuals seek 
resolutions that are best for them. From the community's 
perspective, the trade-off's among individuals are a zero sum 
game in which the community seeks the optimal solution among 
all its members. 
Indeed, due process controversies are often explicitly 
between dueling individual interests.166 One straightforward 
example of this reality can be found in Brock v. Roadway 
Express, Inc. 157 The Secretary of Labor's procedures under Section 
405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 
forbidding retaliatory discharge of employees, were challenged by 
a trucking company as violating procedural due process.158 The 
Company alleged that the employee had intentionally damaged a 
truck, but the employee contended that he was discharged in 
retaliation for having previously complained about safety 
violations.159 The Court recognized the community's interest in 
"promoting highway safety and protecting employees from 
retaliatory discharge."160 Both of these interests compel the 
correct decision and do not necessarily place the community on 
the side of the employer or the employee. The Court considered 
the private interests in tandem: "[T]he employee's substantial 
interest in retaining his job must be considered along with the 
employer's interest in determining the constitutional adequacy of 
the § 405 procedures."161 Like the community's interest, the 
156. Properly characterized in this regard, due process controversies are often 
between competing individual interests in which the government's interest is in 
resolving the dispute. For example, in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), the 
Court applied the Mathews test in evaluating whether Connecticut's prejudgment 
attachment procedure complied with due process. The Court substituted the 
plaintiffs interest for the government's interest in the traditional Mathews test, but 
separated that consideration from "any ancillary interest the government may have 
in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protections." Id. at 11. The Court ultimately decided that the plaintiffs interests 
were minimal and that the government's interest did not affect the balance in favor 
of property owners. See id. at 16 ("Here the plaintiffs interest is de minimis. 
Moreover, the State cannot seriously plead additional financial or administrative 
burdens involving predeprivation hearings when it already claims to provide an 
immediate post deprivation hearing."). But cf. Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 
1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the facts did not support a conclusion that a 
mother had abused her child). In such a case, it is important to note that a court's so 
finding does not mean that a parent's rights are superior to the child's protection. As 
the Whisman court explained, "This does not appear to be a case of balancing the 
parent's liberty interest against the state's interest in protecting the child." Id. 
157. 481 u.s. 252 (1987). 
158. See id. at 255. 
159. See id. at 255-56. 
160. Id. at 262. 
161. Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
2000] DUE PROCESS CALCULUS 667 
individual's interests involved safety, employee rights, and 
adequate procedures. The community interest was on both sides, 
and the community had an interest in the optimum resolution of 
the conflict. 
Focus on the community's interest avoids questions 
concerning which individual rights should be counted.162 For 
example, in Heller v. Doe, the patients challenged the procedures 
that allowed family and guardians to intervene in involuntary 
commitment proceedings.163 Ironically, the patients wanted the 
system to rely on the state's own experts.164 The Court found that 
accurate commitment decisions were in the individual's interest 
as well as the state's.165 Assuming that more information is better 
than less, the Court found that intervention by family and 
guardians, though necessarily biased in favor of commitment, 
increased accuracy.166 That is, the Court concluded that the 
community's interest in reaching the correct commitment 
decision incorporated, in the long run, the patient's and family's 
interests. This approach at least avoids a determination that 
either the patient's or the family's interest is more important. 
The community interest is thus an expression of the individual's 
interest. 
Still, the community and its individual members do come in 
conflict at various points. In a procedural design context, even 
these conflicts do not move the inquiry in different directions, but 
rather affect the final "weight" of the procedural imperative. The 
weighing of the individual interests and community interests still 
creates a combined value rather than shifting the procedural 
design toward one or the other. In this regard, while the two are 
not in direct conflict, their different values force an adjustment in 
the procedural design commensurate with the sensitivity to the 
combined weight of the two interests. That is, the general 
community interests may differ from those of a particular 
individual member, but the conflict translates, in the procedural 
context, into more concern for a procedural design coordiD.ated to 
serve those two major categories of interest. 
162. See Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 978 ("Even if a balancer has properly 
identified the relevant interests and has an objective scale for their valuation, there 
is still the problem of which holders of the relevant interests should be counted."). 
163. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 315 (1993). 
164. See id. at 330 (noting the patients' concern that allowing "guardians and 
immediate family members" to participate in the commitment decision would 
"'skewO the balance' against the retarded individual"). 
165. See id. at 332-33. 
166. See id. 
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In coordinating the individual interest with the community 
interest, it must be understood that the individual's interests 
change in kind when the perspective changes from ex ante to ex 
post. Once an individual has made a special claim on the 
community, his or her interests and those of the community may 
be seen as adverse. Ex post, the community's interest may 
appear to conflict with those of a particular member;167 whereas 
ex ante the community's interest had been the same as the 
individual's.168 For example, when a potential grant applicant is 
interested in the efficient operation of the grant-giving process, a 
conflict is created only after the applicant has failed to qualify 
through that process. Indeed, it is often true that the particular 
individual's interest is intertwined with the particular 
community interest with which the individual is in conflict. An 
individual driver, for example, is more interested as a driver in 
preventing a DUI than is the community in general. Or, although 
the community has only a generalized desire to promote the arts, 
a potential grant recipient has a specific interest in the 
community's commitment to the arts. Although, ex ante, the 
particular individual's interest accords with the community's, the 
individual's interest in the program converts to adverseness ex 
post. Nonetheless, the community's interest continues to 
represent its individual members in both categories. 
Even before the happening of the event supporting the 
individual's claim on the community, these specific adverse 
relationships cancel each other out through community 
dynamics.169 The individual community member is in a 
167. For example, pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act significantly 
affects the liberty interest of arrestees, but "this right may, in circumstances where 
the government's interest [in preventing crime by arrestees] is sufficiently weighty, 
be subordinated to the greater needs of society." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 
739, 750-51 (1987). 
168. In a law enforcement context, for example, the calculation involves other 
individuals. Expedited action against a bank officer was seen as "necessary to 
protect the interests of depositors and to maintain public confidence in our banking 
institutions." FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988). See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing). The 
highway safety value recognized in Dixon v. Love accrues to all drivers, including the 
suspended. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1977) (holding that the Illinois 
statute was designed to protect all drivers by keeping drivers off the roads "who are 
unable or un\villing to respect traffic rules and the safety of others"). Indeed, like the 
depositors in Mallen, the drivers in Love are the major focus of the protection 
afforded; the remainder of society has only an indirect interest. 
169. Lawrence C. Becker, for example, observed: 
In general, discussing disability issues in terms of equality is not 
helpful in this regard-whether it is equality of access, opportunity, life 
prospects, or capacities that we have in mind. Proposals to make people 
equal in some respect invite us to think in terms of conflict. 
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continuous "play'' situation. Game theory provides the best 
objective demonstration of the value of cooperation in this 
situation.170 It has demonstrated a natural instinct for 
cooperation.171 Indeed, this instinct for cooperation is the 
motivation behind community development in the first place; it is 
simply in the individual's interest generally to join a community, 
even if at the expense of some apparent individual 
prerogatives.172 Thus, in the larger sense, even the individual's ex 
post interests and the community's interests tend to dovetail as 
these interests are perceived in the larger context. 
In Goldberg, Justice Brennan himself suggested an example. 
He offered the circumstances of a Mrs. Guzman as showing the 
value of formalized procedures in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) process.173 Were Mrs. Guzman to 
leave the AFDC program, however, which is highly probable, and 
Thinking about reciprocity, however, is helpful here. An effective norm 
of reciprocity resolves problems of pure conflict by seeing to it that people 
who are burdened by one aspect of a social relationship, policy, or 
transaction are benefited in return by another aspect of it. And when 
reciprocity is "full" or complete, meaning that the eventual return to the one 
who has been burdened is proportional to that person's sacrifice, then there 
is no net loss to anyone. . . . These coordination problems are far from 
simple ones, but full reciprocity takes many forms other than a direct tit-
for-tat exchange. 
Lawrence C. Becker, Afterword: Disability, Strategic Action, and Reciprocity, in 
ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON 
JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PuBLIC POLICY 293, 298 (James P. Sterba & Rosemary 
Tong eds., 1998) (footnote omitted). This reciprocity strategy is both more practically 
operational than Pareto superiority, and more subtle, sensitive, and flexible than 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1984) ("The 
difference between Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is just the 
difference between actual and hypothetical compensation."). 
170. The "tit-for-tat" strategy is the simplest and most successful solution. See 
ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION at viii (1984) ("TIT FOR TAT 
is ... the strategy of starting with cooperation, and thereafter doing what the other 
player did on the previous move."); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Strategies in the 
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND SThruLATED ANNEALING 
32, 32-33 (Lawrence Davis ed., 1987) (stating that the highest score in a prisoner's 
dilemma tournament was achieved by the simplest of all the strategies employed, 
"TIT FOR TAT"); see also John H. Miller, The Coevolution of Automata in the 
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, 29 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 87, 88 (1989) (modifying 
the tit-for-tat experiment). 
171. See Teck-Hua Ho, Finite Automata Play Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with 
Information Processing Costs, 20 J. OF ECON. DYNAMICS AND CONTROL 173, 202 
(1996) (demonstrating that even a hostile population prone to defects evolves 
towards cooperative behavior). 
172. See Charles Koch, Cooperative Surplus, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETillCS 
(Lawrence Becker & Charlotte Becker eds., forthcoming 2000). 
173. See Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,256 n.2 (1970). 
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then attempt to return, also probable, she would face a 
formidable procedural apparatus not present when she first 
applied.174 In the continuous procedural "game," which the 
particular societal member is most likely to play, individual 
interest in the procedural design tends to overlap with the 
interest of the community. Justice Black, in his dissent, focused 
on this ironic long run impact.175 
III. ENHANCEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL DESIGN FACTORS 
So, we return to Mathews and its progeny in search of 
coordination. From the two major interest categories, the 
community interests and those of its individual members, emerge 
several other categories of factors or "points of sensitivity." A 
procedural designer, judge, legislator, or official should consider 
each of these points of sensitivity in developing a particular 
procedural design. As these factors are more carefully considered, 
designers will be better informed as to the mix of procedural 
elements that best serve various procedural tasks. Experience, 
and whatever objective information that is, or becomes, available, 
might in this way be applied to particular procedural design 
questions. 
A. Cost Factors 
Cost may be seen as a factor included in the governmental 
program's overall "efficiency." Efficiency is the optimum 
allocation of scarce resources, 176 and procedural design should be 
efficient in the sense that it optimizes tangible and intangible 
resources, including substantive resources, rights, and societal 
responsibility.177 Thus, the system of principles should maximize 
174. Prior to Goldberg, the New York procedure made it easy to get on the 
AFDC rolls and employed nonformal procedural methods in any challenge. See id. at 
257-59 (describing the procedures used). After Goldberg, more formalized procedures 
were required. See id. at 270-71 (mandating, for example, that "the decision maker 
should state the' reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied 
on"). 
175. "Since this process will usually entail a delay of several years, the 
inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed burden will be that the 
government. will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an 
exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility." Id. at 279 (Black, J., 
dissenting). . 
176. Cf. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 725 (3d ed. 1993) 
(defining efficiency as the "capacity to produce desired results with a minimum 
expenditure of energy, time, money, or materials"). 
177. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976) (stating that 
"experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the 
ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burc;len would not be 
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the aggregate of all the values identified herein. But to say that 
due process must be efficient begs the question. 
Procedures impose a variety of costs on both the individual 
and the community. A decision to impose procedures must take 
into account these costs. Unfortunately, Mathews focused 
attention on a very narrow range of costs-those associated with 
governmental process.178 But procedures impose costs on the 
individuals enmeshed in them, often much more daunting to 
them than the government's burden is on the community.179 
Generally, courts are sensitive to the impact of program 
costs injected through procedural and administrative costs. For 
example, in considering the constitutionality of the fee limitation 
in Veteran Administration benefits proceedings, the Supreme 
Court concluded: "[T]his additional complexity will undoubtedly 
engender greater administrative costs, with the end result being 
that less Government money reaches its intended 
beneficiaries."180 Justice Powell, in Mathews, was sensitive to 
these costs: "Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the 
preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be 
found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the 
deserving since resources available for any particular program of 
social welfare are not unHmited."181 Thus, the Court is not only 
sensitive to costs, but also recognizes that costs are a concern 
both for the individuals directly interested in a program and the 
community that established the program. 
Despite this sensitivity to the costs of procedural decisions, 
Mathews analysis is narrowed by its tendency to define costs in 
terms of "expense."182 In the three factors, Justice Powell 
recognized costs only in terms of "fiscal and administrative 
burdens."183 Further, he asserted that "the Government's interest, 
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and 
insubstantial"). 
178. See id. at 348 (stating that the need to conserve scarce fiscal and 
administrative resources is an intportant factor that may outweigh the need for 
additional safeguards for the individual). 
179. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) ("The parens patriae 
interest in helping parents care for the mental health of their children cannot be 
fulfilled if the parents are unwilling to take advantage of the opportunities because 
the admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing, or too contentious."). 
180. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985). 
See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
851 (1977) ("[A]utomatic provision of hearings [for transfer of foster children] ... 
would intpose a substantial additional administrative burden on the State."). 
181. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). 
182. See id. at 347. 
183. See id. at 335. 
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administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. "184 
This formulation focuses on a much too narrow understanding of 
the costs of procedural moves. Perhaps for this reason, cost 
calculations have not been a very compelling reason to curtail 
individual process. For example, in Goldberg, Justice Brennan 
asserted: "'While the problem of additional expense must be kept 
in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the 
ordinary standards of due process."'185 
The cost factor cannot be limited to monetary allocations. 
Indeed, such costs are often the least important. For example, in 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 
the lower court had required a hearing before a child could be 
removed from a foster home at either the request of the foster 
parent or over the foster parent's objection.186 The cost here is that 
if foster parents must engage in extensive procedures to extricate 
themselves from the program, many fewer persons will agree to 
serve as foster parents, creating an even greater shortage. In 
short, the costs are both tangible and intangible and are of 
significant concern to both the community and the individual 
members directly affected by the governmental activity. 
A proper cost factor must focus on "opportunity costs"-what 
is given up in order to make a particular procedural move.187 
Opportunity costs are imposed on both the community and its 
members. The opportunity costs of alternative procedures may be 
converted into substantive costs. Both the community and its 
members face compelling opportunity costs in terms of diverting 
energy and funds from the programs' objectives to bureaucrats 
and lawyers. Because the individuals directly affected by the 
program are in fact affected more directly than the community, 
procedural design must allocate resources so as to be particularly 
sensitive to both tangible and intangible costs as well as possible 
redistribution from a substantive goal of a program to procedural 
devices. 
184. Id. at 348. 
185. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 
F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970)). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541 (1971) (holding that "the state 
may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of ... [liability] in its 
prior hearing"). 
186. 431 U.S. 816, 850-51 (1977) (holding that the District Court's requirement 
that there be an automatic hearing should not be upheld because it would "impose a 
substantial additional administrative burden on the State"). 
187. See ALLAN DESERPA, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 
8 (1985) (defining opportunity cost "as the value of a foregone alternative, usually 
the 'next best' alternative"). 
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Cost also includes the risk of error. Easterbrook, for 
example, asserted: "The goal of due process is to hold as low as 
possible the sum of two costs: the costs created by erroneous 
decisions, including false positives and false negatives, and the 
cost of administering the procedures."188 The cost of error in 
procedural design itself is difficult for a thoughtful court. In lieu 
of objective information, the system tends to bias procedural 
design in favor of the most extensive procedure feasible, whether 
proven useful or not. Recognizing the problem, the Court often 
assures that this instinct for unsupportable formalism does not 
act to the detriment of the other factors.189 
In the absence of better information, the question is often 
handled as one of allocating the risk of error. For example, in a 
case involving commitment procedures for the mentally ill, the 
Court concluded: "The individual should not be asked to share 
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to 
the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to 
the state."190 In order to properly express this cost redistribution, 
the Court required more than a preponderance of evidence to 
commit the mentally ill.191 In tempering its holding, the Court 
observed that an individual, as well as the community, may be 
harmed by the incorrect denial of institutionalization.192 
Procedural designers must make careful judgments about 
allocating potential error costs among the various interests.193 
Again the procedural questions seep over into substantive ones, 
making sensitivity to cost allocation even more compelling. 
Each group of procedural designers must engage in 
sophisticated cost calculations if their procedural judgments are 
to avoid injury to both the community interests and those of its 
members. Because a cost calculation must extend well beyond 
administrative costs, courts must be inclusive and flexible in 
188. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 85, 
110 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1983). 
189. But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976) (arguing that to consider 
the truth or falsity of a government employer's reasons for discharging an employee 
to determine the validity of a due process claim "would enable every discharged 
employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former 
supervisor made a mistake"). 
190. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). 
191. See id. at 431 (concluding that a standard between a preponderance and a 
reasonable doubt was appropriate). 
192. See id. at 429 ("'t cannot be said ... that it is much better for a mentally ill 
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed."). 
193. See Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 110 ("If the goal of the Eldridge 
formula is the maximization of society's wealth, why did the legislature not enact 
the preferable procedures in the first place?"). 
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weighing procedural costs. Justification for procedural moves 
that impose costs may ultimately be satisfied by reference to the 
combined value of the decision to the community and to relevant 
individual members. These costs must, however, to the extent 
possible, be inventoried and assigned some value. 
B. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness is, of course, a crucial aspect of procedural 
design. The community and its individual members are united in 
their concern for effectiveness. Barry v. Barchi, for example, 
involved the suspension of a horse trainer whose horse tested 
positive for drugs after it finished second in a race.194 The Court 
conceded a "most acute" community interest in "preserving the 
integrity of the sport and in protecting the public, "195 an interest 
obviously shared by the horse trainers as well. As to the issue at 
hand, delay in resolving the trainer's suspension, the Court 
observed: "[I]t would seem as much in the State's interest as 
Barchi's to have an early and reliable determination with respect 
to the integrity of those participating in state-supervised horse 
racing."196 
Mathews analysis mandates attention to the advantages 
anticipated from alternative procedures, 197 and procedural 
judgments often depend on the perceived impact of a procedural 
move.198 Judgments about effectiveness, however, are difficult. 
Objective study of procedures is wholly insufficient to support 
most procedural judgments. The contribution of a particular 
194. 443 u.s. 55, 59 (1979). 
195. Id. at 65. 
196. Id. at 66 (finding that the absence of a specified time period in the statute 
between the trainer's suspension and post-suspension hearing violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
197. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 ("An additional factor to be 
considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination 
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards."). 
198. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (declining to 
enlarge the judicial presence in academia after determining that a hearing was not 
likely to improve accuracy in an academic decision); Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 851 (1977) (refusing to add procedures 
to the decisionmaking process of transferring a foster child and observing that "the 
natural parent can generally add little to the accuracy of factfinding concerning the 
wisdom of such a transfer"); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) 
(requiring the state to supply a psychiatrist). On the other hand, in the Social 
Security recoupment context, an oral hearing was found to be worth the cost where 
the absence of fault would justify a waiver of repayment liability. See Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979) ("Evaluating fault ... usually requires an 
assessment of the recipient's credibility, and written submissions are a particularly 
inappropriate way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story from a fabricated tall 
tale.") (citation omitted). 
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procedural device to effectiveness has proven difficult to 
measure.199 For this reason, Mathews analysis tends to tail off 
into a vacuum. Under current learning about the efficacy of 
particular procedural designs, procedural designers must rely on 
a mix of experience, personal judgment, and theoretical claims. 200 
Only in the rarest case might these judgments be informed by 
scientific analysis. Because support for objective analysis is 
inadequate, the discussion here explores evaluation techniques 
that might serve in the absence of sufficient empirical 
information about the value of certain procedures. 
1. Measuring Effectiveness. Accuracy would seem to be an 
obvious effectiveness measure.201 Accuracy, however, proves to be 
a slippery value. For one thing, objective measure of the 
accuracy-generating powers of a given procedural element is 
illusive. 202 Nonetheless, procedural designers must be sensitive to 
at least the goal of accuracy.203 
Accuracy at the first level of analysis is a shared value. In 
the proper context, it recognizes the relationship between the 
individual's interest and the interest of society. The Court 
199. See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 
51 LAW & CONTEl\IP. PROBS. 243, 268-71 (1988) (discussing evidentiary values in 
light of the questionable value of different types of evidence). 
200. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14 (1979) (relying on a study for the proposition that "[t]he 
requirement of a [formal] hearing ... would provide at best a negligible decrease in 
the risk of error"). 
201. See, e.g., McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1997) 
("Achieving an acceptable error rate is an important element of the due process 
calculus under Mathews .... "). 
202. JERRY MAsHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS xx (1978) 
("Investigation of the accuracy of the [agency's] hearing ... leads very quickly to the 
realization that there is no accepted standard for evaluating accuracy."). 
203. For example, the Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services based 
its judgment on the value of the adversarial process in general, and the value of 
counsel on supposition. See 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) ("[O]ur adversary system 
presupposes[ that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained through 
the equal contest of opposed interests .... "). Indeed, the Court expressly recognized 
that empirical research did not demonstrate that representation increased accuracy. 
See id. at 29 n.5. 
Similarly, the Heller v. Doe opinion flounders on the absence of empirical 
data regarding procedural efficacy. See 509 U.S. 312, 329 (1993) (wrestling with the 
issue of whether relatives and guardians should participate in an involuntary 
commitment proceeding). The patients contended that the interest of family 
members was adverse to that of the patients and preferred to rely on the state's 
determination, without the intervention of relatives. See id. at 330. The Court relied 
on the assumption that information from relatives would increase accuracy. See id. 
at 331. This assumption was challenged by the patients' representative, who 
contended that the relatives' participation would "'skew[] the balance'" against the 
patients. Id. at 330. 
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recognized the individual's interest in accuracy in Heller v. Doe: 
"At least to the extent protected by the Due Process Clause, the 
interest of a person subject to governmental action is in the 
accurate determination of the matters before the court, not in a 
result more favorable to him."204 In resolving the due process 
requirements for terminating a mother's rights in Lassiter, the 
Court observed that the community ''has an urgent interest in 
the welfare of the child, [and that] it shares the parent's interest 
in an accurate and just decision."205 The Court summarized the 
interaction of the mother's interest and the community's interest: 
"[T]he parent's interest is an extremely important one ... [and] 
the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct 
decision .... "206 The state provides effective procedures for the 
benefit of both the mother and the child, and the community 
benefits as much or more from the correct resolution of this 
dispute. 207 
Although ideally it would seem that both the community and 
the individual have an interest in accuracy, the individual's 
interest in accuracy cannot be calculated in the same way as that 
of the community. As observed above, sorting out the individual's 
interest to answer the systemic questions of procedural design 
depends on whether the individual is in an ex post or ex ante 
position. Indeed, it must be recognized that the last thing some 
individuals desire is an accurate decision because an accurate 
decision will actually deny them what they seek. Still, while ex 
post an individual may wish for an inaccurate decision in his or 
her favor, individual members are generally served by accurate 
d . . . th 1 208 ecisiOns m e ong run. 
The community always seeks an accurate decision because 
only a correct decision can accomplish its program's goals.209 
Here, however, the government interest may deviate from the 
204. ld. at 332. 
205. 452 U.S. at 27. 
206. ld. at 31. 
207. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979) ("The parens patriae interest 
in helping parents care for the mental health of their children cannot be fulfilled if 
the parents are unwilling to take advantage of the opportunities because the 
admission process is too onerous, too embarrassing, or too contentious."). 
208. Refer to notes 167-72 supra and accompanying text. 
209. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) 
("Quite apart from its duty as a public service company, a utility [a quasi-
governmental entity]-in its own business interests-may be expected to make all 
reasonable efforts to minimize billing errors and the resulting customer 
dissatisfaction and possible injury."); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) 
(refusing to require an individual to post security against a future judgment where 
there was no reasonable possibility of such a judgment being rendered). 
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community's interest. Governmental institutions, just as the 
individual, may not always benefit from an accurate decision. 
But in broad, systemic terms, the community interest is best 
served by a firm accuracy goal. 210 
Still, a simple notion of accuracy cannot suffice as the sole 
measure of effectiveness in our legal culture. 211 Studies suggest 
that the choice of procedure is a choice between types of 
inaccuracy and hence, to some extent, this choice converts the 
effectiveness consideration into a question of social policy.212 
Saks's empirical analysis suggests that procedures are in fact 
often intended to create inaccuracy, and notes examples of law's 
"steps at restraining accuracy by actively pursuing 
inaccuracy."213 He observes that Thibaut and Walker, in a well-
accepted empirical study, found that the adversarial process 
and its rival from the continental system affected the facts 
presented to fact finders. 214 They demonstrated that the 
"inquisitorial" process used on the continent has disadvantages 
in confronting sampling error.215 "However, this study has 
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of 
adversary decisionmaking: the model introduces a systematic 
evidentiary bias in favor of the party disadvantaged by the 
discovered facts. "216 That is, the adversarial process creates an 
incorrect view of the information balance where the weight of 
the evidence clearly rests on one side of the controversy.217 On 
the other hand, another process may create other accuracy bias 
as does the "inquisitorial" model. The fundamental procedural 
210. See, e.g., Stuart v. United States, 109 F.3d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding a low risk of error in the administrative procedure for the cancellation of an 
installment land contract because the Bureau of Indian Affairs had provided a 
detailed paper record and a right to appeal prior to canceling a land sale). 
211. In suggesting reasons why "the law does not pursue a policy of continual 
enhancement of the factfinding process[,]" Michael Saks offered, among others, "that 
accuracy is not everything, and that reliable and valid factfinding has merely been 
trumped by other legitimate values that the law is pursuing." Saks, supra note 199, 
at272. 
212. See id. at 271-73. 
213. Id. at 270 ("Every time the law rejects information that would enhance 
factfinding it is at some level choosing to reduce the likelihood of an accurate 
result."). 
214. See JOliN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 39-40 (1975). 
215. See Saks, supra note 199, at 270 (citing THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 
214, at 39) (observing that the inquisitorial model does not compensate for the 
possibility of incongruence between the evidence presented and evidence available). 
216. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 40. 
217. As discussed below, however, this study established that the adversarial 
model increased satisfaction. See id. at 77, 79-80 (controlling for background and 
cultural differences). 
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choice is actually based on the ''brand" of inaccuracy preferred 
in the legal culture. In general, our procedural design system is 
committed to the adversarial process because it focuses on the 
quality rather than the quantity of the evidence. 
The community's choice of this procedural model implies a 
commitment to a targeted accuracy. Procedural designers might 
choose another ''brand" of accuracy, but they should be conscious 
that this alternate sense of accuracy might be criticized as 
contrary to the community's choice.218 Thus, even in the absence 
of sound information about the actual accuracy contribution of a 
procedural move, a procedural designer might evaluate that 
move as to consistency with the sense of accuracy implied by the 
particular community project. 
2. Filling the Gap in the Absence of Concrete Information 
About Effectiveness. Because objective information about a 
procedure's effectiveness is generally unavailable, procedural 
design at this point must look to surrogates. In lieu of better data 
on effectiveness, procedural designers often resort to 
assumptions based on personal judgment and perceived 
consistency with our legal culture. This experience, whether 
personal or institutional, grounds these assumptions on 
something like empirical information. As discussed below, 
tradition, as an expression of this experience, provides "data" 
about the value of certain procedural moves and this data is 
legitimately part of the effectiveness evaluation. Individual or 
anecdotal information may have considerable value in guiding 
d al d . 219 proce ur es1gn. 
Unfortunately, supporting assumptions are often neither self 
evident nor sufficiently tested. For example, in Goldberg, Justice 
Brennan found that the opportunity for written submission by 
welfare recipients was "an unrealistic option. "220 Yet he relied on 
no objective support.221 It seems equally likely that oral 
218. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) ("The Due Process 
Clause does not ... require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis 
that it may produce results more favorable to the accused."). 
219. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 3, at 1274, 1276 (recognizing the sentiment of 
the court's desire for a full airing of the facts, cross examination of witnesses, and 
the import of a judicial outcome when requiring a hearing). 
220. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). Other courts have made 
similar assertions. See, e.g., Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 159 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (recognizing the policy reasons behind a hearing requirement and finding 
serious procedural deficiencies in the current process that could be alleviated by the 
provision of an oral hearing). 
221. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69 (basing conclusory statements on 
assumptions that welfare recipients are uneducated, poor writers). 
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presentation will be difficult for otherwise disadvantaged 
community members and that the opportunity for written 
submissions will make assistance easier and the process more 
congenial.222 
Many of our legal culture's assumptions are, in fact, 
challenged by some of the empirical work that exists. One 
fundamental assumption in our system, for example, is that the 
decisionmaker who views a witness is the best judge of 
credibility.223 Yet research suggests that, in fact, decisionmakers 
actually do a better job of judging credibility through an 
evaluation of written memorialization.224 Similarly, research 
shows that even lay decisionmakers are capable of distinguishing 
reliable hearsay from unreliable hearsay. 225 Although the 
structural combination of decisionmaking within an interested 
institution is generally contrary to our legal culture,226 a study 
suggested that federal presiding officials feel no greater threat to 
222. Justice Brennan's findings in this regard are somewhat curious on their 
face. After observing that "[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most 
recipients," Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269, Justice Brennan goes on somewhat 
inconsistently to assert: "Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility 
of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the 
issues the decision maker appears to regard as important." Id. Are rhetorical devices 
more valuable to welfare recipients than the opportunity to prepare written 
statements in a familiar environment with the possible assistance of 
nonprofessionals? 
223. See, e.g., Gray Panthers, 652 F.2d at 161 ("Most often mentioned by the 
courts is the notion that an oral hearing provides a way to ensure accuracy when 
facts are in dispute, especially if credibility is an issue."). 
224. See Olin Guy Wellborn Ill, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1087-88 
(1991) ("The assumption that nonverbal channels are more important in the 
communication of deception than the verbal cues is simply not true."); see also 
Margaret A. Lareau & Howard R. Sacks, Assessing Credibility in Labor Arbitration, 
5 LAB. LAW. 151, 155-56 (1989) ("Thus, at least some traditional notions about the 
relationship between witness demeanor and witness credibility are simply not so."). 
225. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and 
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) ("Proponents of reform argue 
'that it is better to admit flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the opponent 
a chance to expose its defects, than to take the chance of a miscarriage of justice 
because the trier is deprived of information.' ... This study suggests that jurors are, 
in fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of differentiating between accurate 
and inaccurate hearsay testimony.") (footnote omitted). 
226. Compare Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1984) (questioning the propriety of immigration judges' 
being subject to the influence of the INS's "political leadership"), and Friendly, supra 
note 3, at 1279 ("Instead of the Goldberg formulation permitting a welfare official 
(even with some involvement in the very case) to act as decisionmaker[,] ... there is 
wisdom in recognizing that the further the tribunal is removed from the agency and 
thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural 
safeguards."), with Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-97 (1982) (finding a 
presumption of no bias, despite a lack of structural separation, and that any bias 
must be proved directly). 
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their independence when housed in the agency than when 
"protected" from the agency through administrative law judge 
status.227 
Absent empirical information, the second best solution might 
be the consideration of how procedures should carry out their 
functions, rather than relying on personal bias and unsupported 
assumptions. Fortunately, some very insightful conceptual 
analysis is available. Legal theorists offer some valuable 
guidance that might serve in lieu of objective information about 
the procedural moves and that might guide incorporation of 
whatever empirical information is or will become available. 
Fuller offered an indirect method for evaluating procedural 
effectiveness: mode of participation. 228 Evaluation of due process 
might begin with the "norms" of participation. These norms give 
adjudication its moral force as against other processes. 229 
Eisenberg focused the search for participation norms on the 
reaction of the decisionmaker.230 He suggested three valuable 
norms: 
The adjudicator should attend to what the parties have 
to say. 
The adjudicator should explain his decision in a manner 
that provides a substantive reply to what the parties 
have to say. 
The decision should be strongly responsive to the parties' 
proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed 
from and be congruent with those proofs and 
arguments. 231 
Indeed, responsiveness to proof and argument distinguishes 
adjudication from other types of governmental decisionmaking 
processes. 
227. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 
ADMIN. L. REv. 271, 277-80 (1994) (citing a survey offederal adjudicators' opinions 
about the challenges to their independence). 
228. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 364-65 (1978) ("This whole analysis will derive from one simple proposition, 
namely, that the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it 
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision .... "). 
229. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the 
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 430 (1978) 
(noting that once the relevant legal principles are established, the parties are better 
situated to negotiate to a binding decision in spite of any prior incorrect premise 
concerning legal obligations). 
230. See id. at 411-12 (advocating that the norms of participation are proactive 
obligations of the adjudicator). 
231. Id. 
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What norm of responsiveness might guide evaluation of the 
effectiveness? In United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, the Court stated: "The purpose of an adversary hearing 
is to ensure the requisite neutrality that must inform all 
governmental decisionmaking."232 The decisionmaker must be 
clearly receptive to the proof and argument generated by 
whatever means, however informal.233 A restraint on 
decisionmaker dominance is perceived as a significant "norm. "234 
Many of the processes prevent information from reaching the 
decisionmaker and limit the decisionmaker's range of 
consideration. 235 
Adjudication resolves individual disputes but it also develops 
community centered decisions. This second function is obviously 
of greater interest to the community than to the individual.236 
Effectiveness, then, must also be measured in terms of 
facilitating incorporation and growth of community values. This 
distinction is important in terms of information the process must 
produce. Where the process must generate ''legislative facts" in 
order to support the development of community interests, it 
should differ from its role of responsiveness to "adjudicative 
facts" necessary to resolve individual disputes.237 Fuller noted 
that adjudication has a limited capacity for "polycentric" 
problems.238 He offered several situations in which the process is 
"dealing with a situation of interacting points of influence and 
therefore with a polycentric problem beyond the proper limits of 
232. 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (criticizing ex parte preseizure proceedings). 
233. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1279 (arguing that the more impartial the 
decisionmaker, the "less procedural formality" is necessary). 
234. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 119 (suggesting litigants have 
a common interest in limiting the control of the decisionmaker). 
235. See id. at 121 (recognizing that a requisite degree of disputant control over 
the procedure assures the parties full opportunities to present their evidence). 
236. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164 (The Foundation Press, 
Inc. 1994) (1958) ("The body of decisional law announced by the courts in the 
disposition of these [individual] problems tends always to be the initial and 
continues to be the underlying body oflaw governing the society."). 
237. See Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 413 (recognizing that the court is 
generally limited and bound by the parties' proofs and not free to make an 
independent inquiry). Saks suggested that the law intuitively avoids totally 
predictable answers in order to assure that judges have sufficient numbers of "data 
points" so they may be informed in their lawmaking capacity. See Saks, supra note 
199, at 274 ("If the courts have too few cases in their sample, they will not have 
enough exposure to social problems to provide effective guidance through wise rules; 
if they are overwhelmed by caseloads, they cannot give them the attention necessary 
to develop thoughtful law."). 
238. See Fuller, supra note 228, at 395. 
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adjudication."239 Eisenberg asserted: "Adjudication is an 
appropriate ordering process only when decision can be reached 
by determining rights through the application of an authoritative 
standard."240 Adjudicative-type responsiveness is thus 
inappropriate for problems involving "multiple criteria" as well.241 
The participation criteria must vary according to whether 
the adjudication focuses more on individual dispute resolution or 
on the implementation of community projects. Eisenberg asserted 
that if the latter is dominant, then the process should be 
"consultative," and not strongly responsive to proof and 
argument.242 Adjudication must, nonetheless, deal with a wide 
variety of disputes. In many of these disputes, it must resolve 
interacting controversies, and it must apply multiple criteria. In 
short, adjudication must develop, or at least glean, societal 
values. To the extent these functions are necessary to resolving 
the individual dispute, the individual interests are intertwined 
with the community interest in a dynamic social ordering. 
Procedural design must assure the effective accomplishment of 
each of these tasks. 
In the absence of information about the particular 
procedure's value, procedural design can focus on the appropriate 
kind and degree of participation by the necessary individual 
community members.243 It can also analyze the capacity for the 
process to be sensitive to broader community values. 244 In short, 
procedural design can match participation to the goals of the 
process. When Eisenberg's "responsiveness" is key, then the 
design should focus on individualizing participation. When, 
however, general values become important, design must shift to a 
more "consultative" process. Each of these moves, however, must 
always be sensitive to both the community's interests and those 
of its individual members. Such judgments can be guided by 
239. ld. 
240. Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 424. 
241. See id. at 424-25 (stating that polycentricity involves choices that are 
interactive, such as choosing players for different positions on a football team; the 
concept of multiple criteria, in contrast, describes choices with no interaction). 
242. See id. at 414-23 (reasoning that this path will bear more fruit for the 
collective community). 
243. But see the value of participation in different decisionmaking models in 
Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 207 (1997) (valuing participation 
because it lends legitimacy, provides information, makes the process fairer, and 
forges a greater understanding and consensus about the co=on good). 
244. An unfortunate impediment to evolving this understanding is the long-
standing law that procedural due process does not apply to rulemaking which, as 
discussed below, prevents the courts from participating in procedural development 
for that form of decisionmaking. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at § 2.20[3]. 
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whatever information, experience, and thinking is available. 
And, as more information about the value of procedural elements 
becomes available, these conceptual aspects of effectiveness will 
guide the application of that information. 
C. The Nature and Extent of the Substantive Impact on the 
Individual 
By its nature, procedure suggests a norm of substantive 
neutrality.245 A commonality is easier to accept in the procedural 
context because the community's goal in that context is 
generally some objective substantive judgment.246 A purely 
procedural move, then, should not favor a particular 
substantive outcome.247 
Yet, while separating the resolution of substantive issues 
from the process is analytically necessary, the decision's potential 
impact on the individual and society must be a factor in the 
degree of attention paid to procedural issues. The resolution of 
some claims will not compel the same process as those having a 
more significant impact even though the individual has the same 
level of interest in the outcome in both circumstances. A research 
grant, for example, will not justify the same level of process as a 
disability claim, even though both are serious matters to the 
245. See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 250 (1986) ("This test classifies as substantive those laws which 
have an effect on primary conduct, on transactions and relationships apart from the 
courtroom setting. Those laws which affect only the conduct within the litigation are 
classified as procedural."). An example of this valuable method for drawing the 
distinction between procedure and substance is the difference between a law that 
sets a 30 MPH speed limit, and one that requires an appeal to be filed within 30 
days. Although both involve speed, the former is substantive and the latter is 
procedural. This distinction works even if some difficulty remains at the margin: See 
generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 726 
(1974) (arguing that procedural goals are "concerned only with the most sensible 
way to manage a litigation process," but substantive rules are the laws concerning 
deterrence and compensation). 
246. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that "the Government has a legitimate interest in excluding evidence 
which is not relevant or is confusing"). However, those litigating against the 
government have the same interest over time. Ultimately, both individuals and the 
community have an interest in not having irrelevant and confusing information 
presented to the decisionmakers. 
247. Even assuming that there are many conflicting and incommensurable 
conceptions of good, each compatible with the full rationality of human persons, a 
workable political conception of justice would mean that procedures, while not 
actually attaining neutrality, can at least be evaluated for absorbing the disparate 
substantive values, systems, conceptions or principles. See John Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 223, 248 (1985) 
(considering the way in which social unity and stability may be understood by 
liberalism as a political doctrine). 
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individual claimant. Procedural design must adjust to the impact 
of the substantive outcome. 248 
Goldberg focused procedural due process analysis on the extent 
of the substantive loss. It required an extensive, formal process-
indeed, a trial-like procedure-for decisions concerning a "grievous 
loss."249 This unfortunate formulation forced the Mathews Court to 
conclude that the claimant did not face a "grievous loss," even 
though there is no useful substantive distinction between the losses 
in the two cases.250 Rather, Justice Powell, in Mathews, needed to 
win back the freedom to tailor procedural design according to a 
particular program's needs. 251 A doctrine that prescribed trial-like 
procedures in every case involving substantial loss was quickly 
deemed unworkable.252 Nonetheless, Powell did include the weight 
of the substantive question in his procedural design evaluation.253 
The magnitude of the individual interest, while not relevant to 
whether it is protected by due process (which is determined by 
whether it falls into the category of protected interests), is reflected 
. d aid . 254 m proce ur es1gn. 
Still, while the decision has a direct impact on the 
individual, it is clear that the community and individual 
248. As discussed below, individuals will evaluate the process by its results. See 
Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant: 
An Empirical Investigation, 20 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 165 (1996) (discussing 
participants' perceptions of procedural justice). 
249. "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient 
is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous 
loss' .... " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
250. Compare Justice Powell's contention: "The potential deprivation here is 
generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be 
overstated," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976), with Justice Brennan's 
dissent: "[T]he Court's consideration that a discontinuance of disability benefits may 
cause the recipient to suffer only a limited deprivation is no argument," id. at 350 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
251. See id. at 343 ("[T]here is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from 
the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an 
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."). 
252. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 1299-1301. 
253. See id. at 1301-02. 
254. For example, in distinguishing Dixon v. Love, another driver's license 
suspension case, the Court in Mackey v. Montrym stated: 
The private interest involved here actually is less substantial, for the 
Massachusetts statute authorizes suspension for a maximum of only 90 
days, while the Illinois scheme permitted suspension for as long as a year 
and even allowed for the possibility of indefinite revocation of a license. 
The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest 
is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the 
private interest involved. 
443 u.s. 1, 12 (1979). 
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interests work in tandem.255 In rating individual interests, for 
example, Friendly observed that, ''whatever the mathematics, 
there is a human difference between losing what one has and not 
getting what one wants."256 This is no less true for the community 
than for the individual. The community, like the individual, is 
adversely affected when one of its members loses something. 
Adjustments must be made in community arrangements to 
accommodate the loss, and, hence, the "transaction costs" impose 
a deadweight loss on the community. 
The substantive impacts add up to increase the demand for 
attention to procedural design.257 The nature and extent of the 
substantive impacts affect procedural design regardless of 
whether that impact is identified with the community interest or 
the interest of the community's members.258 The crucial point is 
that the weight of the impact affects the procedural design and 
the weight of the community's interests and its individual 
members move in the same direction, if with different magnitude 
or velocity.259 What has an impact on the individual, has an 
impact on the community; their interests are not truly adverse. 
255. Therefore: 
Society has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from the 
consequences of his criminal activity-both from potential physical injury 
which may be suffered when a victim fights back or a policeman attempts to 
make an arrest and from the downward spiral of criminal activity into 
which peer pressure may lead the child. 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266 (1984) (upholding a New York statute 
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles to prevent them from committing other 
crimes) (citation omitted). 
256. Friendly, supra note 3, at 1296; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska 
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (discussing the "human 
difference" between grant of parole and revocation). 
257. Friendly observed: 
As we go down the [list of various types of government action] from the 
more severe actions to the less, the needle would point to fewer and fewer 
requirements on the list of required safeguards. With the probable 
exception of Goldberg itself, the Court's decisions seem to conform to this 
scheme. 
Friendly, supra note 3, at 1278-79 (footnotes omitted). 
258. However, the general failure to carefully articulate the "government's 
interest" in various substantive controversies seriously inhibits this analysis in 
procedural design as well. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 937. 
259. A disproportionate substantive impact on one or the other must also shape 
the procedural design. For example, the Fifth Circuit found that "[w]hen public 
safety is an issue, liberty or property interests can be deprived even without a prior 
hearing." McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997). A substantive 
value such as "public safety" could be seen as the "grievous loss" equivalent in the 
community interest calculation calling for special procedural design. As suggested 
above, however, these conflicts between ex post individual interests and community 
interests do not separate the interests when viewed as part of a continuous 
relationship in which the individual ultimately benefits from the community's 
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D. Community Maintenance 
Community maintenance must be a factor in procedural 
design.260 At first blush, this factor might seem of no concern for 
the individual. However, the community's existence is important 
to its members. For example, a teenage mother or a permanently 
disabled person reaps many benefits from membership in a 
community that is sensitive to their needs (whether it expresses 
that sensitivity by active government or otherwise). The 
community exists to serve the individuals and the individuals 
reap the benefit only if the community continues to exist. 261 Thus, 
community maintenance is both a community and an individual 
value. 
Indeed, the procedural design question involves the 
community members whose interests are protected or advanced 
by the relevant program and hence who stand to gain the most 
from being members of the particular community. In recognition 
of the individual's interest, for example, the Court found that the 
very reason aliens claim due process rights is to remain members 
of this particular community.262 A breakdown in a community 
sensitive to an individual's special needs would be devastating 
for the individuals directly involved, whereas it would be a mere 
inconvenience for others. Ironically, then, maintenance of the 
particular style of community, may be more important to the 
individual than to the community itself. The community's 
concern for values such as "public safety." 
260. The Supreme Court has stated: 
[T]he Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal 
revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to 
protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the 
public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food. 
. . . [P]rejudgment replevin statutes serve no such important 
governmental or general public interest. 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 
Further: 
To protect government's exceedingly strong interest in financial stability in 
this context, we have long held that a State may employ various financial 
sanctions and summary remedies, such as distress sales, in order to 
encourage taxpayers to make timely payments prior to resolution of any 
dispute over the validity of the tax assessment. 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 37 
(1990). 
261. See Becker, supra note 169, at 294 ("I will argue that we can resolve many 
conflicts about disability and distributive justice by treating them as coordination 
problems."). 
262. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (respecting the procedural 
rights of a permanent resident alien who was excluded after attempting to smuggle 
aliens across the border). 
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interest is in its survival; the individual's interest is in the 
survival of the particular community that protects or serves his 
or her interests.263 Thus, for both the sake of the community's 
interests and those of individual members, procedural design 
must value community maintenance. 
E. Acceptability 
Procedural design must seek "acceptability."264 Acceptability 
is often expressed as the appearance of fairness.265 Although 
appearance should not compromise other important values, it is 
itself a relevant value in the due process system of principles. 
Acceptability is at least as important to the community as it is to 
the individuals, and in fact may best be characterized as an 
inherently community-related factor in the procedural design. 
Of course, perceptions about the justice of the outcome itself 
affect acceptability by disinterested community members, as well 
as those directly affected by the decision. 266 Hence, acceptability 
cannot be divorced from cost/effectiveness in procedural design. 
Accuracy, however, does not necessarily create acceptability. For 
instance, a machine that can be proven to always deliver correct 
determinations as to permanent disability at a very low cost, and 
little inconvenience to the participants, will not necessarily be 
accepted. 267 Certain procedural design characteristics will 
263. See Murphy, supra note 125, at 590. Murphy stated: 
I d. 
If it could be shown ... that even the persons treated unequally will be 
better off under the unequal practice than they would be under a practice 
that eliminated the inequality, then these persons are in no obvious sense 
being exploited for the general welfare. Thus it is by no means clear that 
they experience-at least ultimately-any injustice. They are winners too, 
and thus they no doubt would have rationally willed such an unequal 
practice in a Rawlsian original position. 
264. See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A 
Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (1974) ("[A] legal process can be 
good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be good not only as a 
means to good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process 
values such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness."). 
265. "[J]ustice must satisfy [even] the appearance of justice." Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980) (quoting Offatt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 
14 (1954)). 
266. See Stolle, supra note 248, at 165 (observing from a study in which a group 
of people was asked to evaluate certain processes that, "[i]n general, case outcome 
was a major contributor to participants' perceptions of procedural justice"). 
267. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 199, at 259. While not offering perfect accuracy, 
studies show that the polygraph is better able to detect lying than humans. Yet we 
would not replace human factfinders' credibility judgments with polygraph 
examinations. Saks observed: 
Despite all of their experience and intuition, people are not skilled in the 
688 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [37:635 
improve acceptability regardless of outcome and, given the 
difficulty of measuring accuracy, the nature of the process may 
be a crucial aspect of acceptability. 
Here we need to examine separately those considerations 
that affect the acceptability of the process.268 These include 
satisfaction, cultural values and traditions, dignity, equality, 
and consistency. 269 
1. Satisfaction. Procedural design must value participant 
satisfaction. The community and its directly affected members 
have an interest in the member's satisfaction with the process. 
Indeed, in the long run, the community has more interest in 
satisfactory treatment of its constituent members than do the 
members themselves. While individual members often have only 
one experience with a process, the cumulative effect of members' 
dissatisfaction would be harmful, even dangerous, to the 
community. 
Conclusions about satisfaction, however, must go beyond the 
intuitive. Unfortunately, as with the other procedural design 
aspects, there is little empirical information about satisfaction. 
Little experiential "data" has been developed because procedural 
designers-courts, officials, and legislators-rarely justify their 
procedural decisions in terms of satisfaction. Hence, thinking and 
information about satisfaction is largely absent to guide our 
procedural design in that regard. 
Fortunately, some information about the impact of 
procedures on satisfaction is available. For example, Thibaut and 
Walker provided an in-depth empirical examination into the 
factors that foster satisfaction in a legal process. 270 They 
unaided detection of lying. With all of its limitations, the polygraph 
examination process, in capable hands, errs less often. Yet the law's 
attitude toward this means of credibility assessment is clear. The right and 
power of jurors and judges to assess witness credibility intuitively is 
strongly protected and preserved-despite the fact that demeanor adds 
little to transcripts in terms of accuracy, and despite the fact that some of 
the very cues that factfinders are expected to rely upon actually reduce the 
accuracy of their assessments. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
268. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 
1988) (recognizing the value of process). Although Tribe distinguishes an 
"instrumental" approach from an "intrinsic" approach, see id., the latter generally 
corresponding to the "acceptability" category, procedural design can still be guided 
by a combination of values that makes use of both approaches. 
269. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 46, 54, 57 (listing these values in addition to 
the "utilitarian" values he found in Mathews). 
270. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 1-3 (summarizing the purposes 
of the study); see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 752-53 (1976) (describing Thibaut's and Walker's conclusion 
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compared the so-called "adversary'' process, the passive 
decisionmaker model,271 with its continental rival, the 
unfortunately termed "inquisitory" process,272 the active 
decisionmaker model.273 Thibaut and Walker found that "[o]ne of 
the most intriguing findings for participant subjects was the 
linear increase in satisfaction with the procedure, perceived 
fairness of the procedure, and opportunity for evidence 
presentation as the procedural mode moved along the continuum 
from the inquisitorial to the choice adversary method."274 
Uninvolved observers and continental subjects-those not 
habituated to the adversarial process-showed a similar 
preference for the adversary process.275 This satisfaction 
emanates from leveling even though it distorts the true balance 
of factual support for one of the positions.276 They also observed 
that "subjects are more willing to trust an adversary system than 
an inquisitorial attorney to produce accurate, unbiased 
judgments."277 That is, participants and observers were impressed 
by the adversarial model's restraints on the conduct of the 
decisionmakers. 
These findings have generalized implications for furthering 
satisfaction in procedural design. It is clear that the process for 
reaching the decision substantially affects satisfaction. 278 The 
crucial advantage of the adversary process, for example, is not 
that the adversary system is better than the inquisitorial system because it is more 
just). 
271. See TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 22-27. 
272. See id. 
273. In actual operation, the continental process is very adversarial. The 
difference is that the adversariness takes place in the decisionmaking stage rather 
than in the information gathering stage. Because the lawyers in the decisionmaking 
process tend to be the best lawyers in the system, dialogue at that stage should add 
considerably to the validity of the process. 
274. TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 94. Other studies have confirmed 
this finding in various settings. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 211-14 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988). 
275. See TH!BAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 77-80. 
276. See id. at 77-78 (explaining that "[t]he subjects ... were presumably aware 
of the frequent use of adversary procedures in American trials and might have seen 
any deviation ... as ... untrustworthy and unsatisfactory"). 
277. Id. 
278. See Kovera, supra note 225, at 720. Kovera noted: 
Psychological research . . . suggests that if participants perceive trial 
proceedings to be unfair, they will not be satisfied that justice has been 
served. This study's results suggest that this concern may be 
unwarranted .... This decrease in the level of juror satisfaction ... appears 
to be linked to the inadequacy of the hearsay evidence presented in these 
conditions. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (questioning the validity of the theory that a participant's level 
of satisfaction is based on whether trial proceedings are fair or not). 
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improvement in perceived accuracy (in fact, it may prove less 
accurate than its competitor), but improvement in the 
atmosphere of participant control as opposed to institutional 
control (even if scrupulously impartial). By the choice of a 
general commitment to adversarial individual dispute resolution 
process, our community can be said to value satisfaction. 
Therefore, a procedural design should reflect this goal. 
2. Cultural Imperatives and Tradition. Cultural values 
ground our perceptions concerning which process should be 
used.279 In procedural design, as with other aspects of human 
process, it is difficult to maintain the existence of universal, 
fundamental truths, and hence cultural values must direct 
procedural design.28° Cultural values implicate a vast array of 
inquiries into ethics and morality, and quickly reach beyond the 
scope of the procedural design context.281 Sufficient here is the 
279. See Waldron, supra note 116, at 814 ("In the realm of practical life, we do 
not just do things; rather, we have beliefs about what we ought to do, and our actions 
are at least in part the upshot of those beliefs."). 
280. Cultural values, however, may have less influence on our evaluation of 
procedures than might be supposed. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, 
at 79-80 (providing that satisfaction with the adversary process was the same for 
those from other cultures). 
281. One dominant inquiry about the relationship between the law and cultural 
values has recently formed around the dialogue between liberalism and 
communitarianism. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA 
IN SEARCH OF A PuBLIC PHILOSOPHY 16 (1996) (observing that liberalism does not 
focus on the common good-communitarianism-but that it actually focuses on 
which values each individual supports); COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 
(Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992); STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, 
LmERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 10 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the communitarian view 
that liberal political theory divorces the individual from the end sought); Kenneth 
Baynes, The Liberal Communitarian Controversy and Communicative Ethics, in 
UNIVERSALISM VS. COMMUNITARIANISM 61 (David Rasmussen ed., 1990) (asserting 
that a controversy exists between liberals and communitarians because liberals 
focus on rights and communitarians focus on the common good, concepts the two 
groups believe do not overlap); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1514 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1539, 1566 (1988). Procedural design, as elsewhere, may be guided by Amy 
Gutmann's observation: "Communitarianism has the potential for helping us 
discover a politics that combines community with a commitment to basic liberal 
values." Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 
308, 320 (1985). The communitarian project may have relevance in procedural 
design. To paraphrase Sandel, if concern about aggregate or community values 
might undervalue our distinctness, concerns about individual fairness might 
undervalue our commonality. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIDERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE 16 (1982) [hereinafter SANDEL, LmERALISM] ("If utilitarianism fails to take 
seriously our distinctness, justice as fairness fails to take seriously our 
commonality."). My inquiry rests on a coherence between individual fairness and 
community. It refers to this dialogue as it might illuminate some overarching values 
that might be incorporated into our principles for procedural design. With hopes of 
avoiding a digression into the massive and sophisticated literature here, my inquiry 
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assertion that the inclusion of cultural values into the system for 
procedural design is legitimate and necessary. 
More to the point, however, is the understanding that 
cultural values affect the weight of both community values and 
individual members' values. That is, the two cannot be held 
adverse and balanced against each other. Indeed, the cultural 
values of a process are more heavily felt by the community than 
by the individual.282 For one thing, courts have long assumed that 
the overarching community standard is procedural fairness. 283 
Statutes are assumed to incorporate fair procedures,284 and the 
due process clauses have been read to express a fundamental 
community demand for procedural fairness when those statutory 
prescriptions fall short. 285 Combined, this law expresses a 
can merely advocate mining the dialogue for a robust inventory of community values 
as they relate to individual values. 
The most controversial aspect of communitarian thinking is the 
aggressiveness of the state in generating good values among its citizens, for 
example, providing education and other incentives to foster devotion to the 
community. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote 
Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1352-53 (1991) (observing that some 
attack liberalism as being "devoid of moral substance"); Sheppard, supra note 52, at 
1009-10 ("The law should encourage a citizen to live a good life and discourage a 
citizen from living a bad life."). "Legal perfectionism" asserts "that the law, through 
its sanctions and encouragements, makes it more likely that an individual will live 
the life of a good citizen .... [T]he doctrine oflegal perfectionism does not imply the 
promotion of any single deontological or natural conception of law." ld. at 1010. The 
implication of this dialogue for procedural design may have been expressed by 
Vikram Amar: "[A] law may run afoul of substantive due process not because of what 
is on the individual's side of the scale, but rather because of the perfectionist aim 
that may be on the government's side of the balance." Vikram David Amar, Some 
Questions About Perfectionist Rationality Reuiew, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 1029, 1029-31 
(1994) (observing that courts may have trouble determining whether the 
perfectionist aims are being furthered). 
282. See, e.g., SANDEL, LmERALISM, supra note 281, at 149 (observing that 
community interests are viewed as either wholly external to individual interests or 
only partly internal to the individual). 
283. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137-38 (1991) (noting the 
Supreme Court's willingness to construe statutes authorizing deprivations of liberty 
or property as requiring adequate process). 
284. See, e.g., id. at 132-34, 137-38 (explaining that the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 is assumed to incorporate fair procedures). 
285. In Arnett u. Kennedy, Justice Rehnquist urged that where the law creating 
the due process interest also prescribes procedures, one must accept those 
procedures if one is claiming the right derived from that source. See 416 U.S. 134, 
153-54 (1974). This approach, however, was not adopted by a majority of the justices 
even in Arnett v. Kennedy. See id. at 210-11. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 
355, 360-61 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying on the 
abbreviated procedures provided by the city ordinance to ignore a due process 
violation). The "bitter with the sweet" approach has since been consistently rejected 
by the vast majority of the justices. For example, the Supreme Court in Vitek u. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980), and more recently in Cleveland Board of 
Education u. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985), soundly rejected the "bitter with 
692 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [37:635 
community standard from which we must extract a foundational 
community interest in procedural fairness for the community's 
individual members. 
A major source of cultural values is tradition,286 and nowhere 
is tradition a more powerful force than in legal procedures. 
Tradition, of course, forms the system by which the community 
and its individuals measure a process and the foundational 
values inherent in a procedural design's acceptance.287 Sherry 
concluded: "[O]ur traditions have value, and I would add only 
that we must be careful of exaggerating that value."288 Legal 
tradition is a very strong motivator in resolving an array of 
d l t . 289 proce ura ques Ions. 
Although tradition is inherently a community value, the 
community interest is necessarily intertwined with individual 
interests. Our tradition values fairness and sensitivity to 
individual community members. The individual interests, on the 
other hand, support attention to a community that furthers those 
values.29° From either perspective, then, tradition demands a 
commitment to both effectiveness and individual fairness. 
Tradition must be a tool and not merely dogma. At present, 
tradition has substantial influence on procedural design in part 
because of the absence of information regarding the effectiveness 
of various procedural elements.291 Incorporating tradition into 
procedural design must separate tradition's emotional impact 
from the weight of the "data" embedded in tradition. Tradition is, 
to some extent, formed by the empirical base of experience. For 
example, Justice Scalia observed: "To say that unbroken 
historical usage cannot save a procedure that violates one of the 
the sweet" approach. Compliance with due process is always at issue regardless of 
whether the decisionmakers complied with statutory procedures or not. 
286. See Suzanna Sherry, Public Values and Private Virtue, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 
1099, 1099-1100 (1994) (recognizing how powerful the value of tradition is in law). 
287. See id. at 1100 (acknowledging the importance of tradition but propounding 
that "we must be both willing and reluctant to alter the status quo, avoiding both an 
unthinking adherence to tradition and an overeagerness for change"). 
288. ld. (recognizing many of the observations offered by Novak relating to our 
tradition of community values and active government). 
289. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (observing that in a 
criminal procedure context, the "primary guide in deterolining whether the principle 
in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice"); Connecticut v. Doehr, 
501 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1991) (finding a state prejudgment attachment statute to violate 
due process because, among other things, it was inconsistent with common law). 
290. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 47-48 (furthering the idea that individuals 
want the community to foster fairness and sensitivity). 
291. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 36 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (conceding that tradition holds value in part because 
other alternatives are lacking). 
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explicit procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights (applicable 
through the Fourteenth Amendment) is not necessarily to say 
that such usage cannot demonstrate the procedure's compliance 
with the more general guarantee of 'due process."'292 
To some extent, tradition is the result of an evolutionary 
process in which defects in procedural design have been probed 
and experimental correction tested. Ossifying tradition inhibits 
the very evolutionary strategy that it might be said to 
implement. Nowhere is that more true than in procedural design. 
Mashaw, while valuing tradition's evolutionary aspects, observed 
its limitations: "The use of tradition as a guide to fundamental 
fairness is vulnerable, of course, to objection. Since social and 
economic forces are dynamic, the processes and structures that 
proved functional in one period will not necessarily serve 
effectively in the next."293 
The message of tradition, especially as a source of 
information about procedural design, is somewhat ambiguous. 
Our legal culture is dominated by a model of trial procedures 
that evolved from the English experience. 294 The adversarial 
process in our system, for example, gains special support from 
our own custom and usage. 295 Nonetheless, procedural design 
under the due process clauses has had a tradition of flexibility, 
moderating this dominance of trial-like procedures. Even as to 
the more fundamental notion of adversariness, courts break 
free in cases where evidence suggests that traditional 
procedural design is outweighed by other factors. For example, 
in Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court found that 
"frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical 
professionals" may be superior to an adversarial hearing in 
292. Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). On the other hand, in 
Connecticut v. Doehr, Justice Scalia concluded that the Mathews test could 
invalidate procedures that were not recognized at common law. See Doehr, 501 U.S. 
at 30-31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also City 
of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 242 (1999) ("The notice required by the 
Court of Appeals far exceeds that which the States and the Federal Government 
have traditionally required their law enforcement agencies to provide."). 
293. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 54. Still, tradition must be incorporated into the 
system of principles as other than an anecdotal surrogate for data. Although it is 
only one factor, it must dominate the others. 
294. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Delaware Cases, 1792-1800, in ESSAYS 
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 489, 508-09 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969) 
(describing the English legal procedures as "new foreign weapons which enabled 
[Americans] to fight each other bitterly and endlessly"). 
295. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137 (1991) (declaring that 
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplated an adversarial 
process). 
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determining whether an inmate should be given psychiatric 
drugs against his will. 296 
The founding society cannot be said to have had a dogmatic 
vision of those procedures that might comply with the due 
process clauses. Indeed, it is more likely that they understood 
the Fifth Amendment at least to envision a wide range of 
procedural designs. Jefferson, and presumably others, were 
familiar with continental procedures and those procedures were 
not based on common law procedural assumptions.297 It might be 
that the early designers preferred the English system, but it 
must also be true that they recognized that its assumptions 
were not universally accepted. The fact that the French, for 
example, continued the so-called "inquisitorial process" even in 
criminal proceedings after their revolution298 suggests that this 
process was not held in great disregard by progressive thinkers 
of the time. The meaning of due process envisioned a wide range 
of alternatives, and hence the original meaning of that 
guarantee does not support a tradition of inflexible commitment 
to Anglo-American notions. 
Our tradition, as it affects acceptability, moves between the 
preference for adversariness, influenced by the Anglo-American 
trial model, and the desire to maintain institutional flexibility.299 
Tradition does not dictate trial-like procedures.300 Still, we have a 
strong tradition of participant control as opposed to the 
continental tradition of decisionmaker control. This tradition is 
an example of both the embodiment of experience and the 
longstanding emotional commitment inherent in the tradition 
factor. 
3. Dignity. "Dignity'' here encompasses a variety of related 
human elements that should be considered in procedural design. 
296. 494 U.S. 210, 231-33 (1990) (recognizing that medical professionals are 
superior to the court in determining a patient's method of care); see also Williams v. 
Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (11th Cir. 1984) (listing reasons medical 
professionals are as competent to make decisions as the court). 
297. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1789, at 266 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
298. See Edward A. Tomlinson, The Saga of Wiretapping in France: What it 
Tells us About the French Criminal System, 53 LA. L. REV. 1091, 1103-04 (1993) 
(discussing France's "inquisitorial" process). 
299. Compare Burns, 501 U.S. at 137-38 (preferring adversariness in judicial 
proceedings), with Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 (preferring a non-adversarial process in 
recognizing that a decision to medicate a patient may be better made by medical 
professionals than by a judge). 
300. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 ("The Due Process Clause 'has never been 
thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained.'") 
(quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)). 
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Robert Summers identified dignity considerations as core 
"process values."301 Mashaw asserted: ''Whereas the utilitarian 
approach [suggested by Mathews] seems to require an estimate of 
the quantitative value of the claim, the dignitary approach 
suggests that the Court develop a qualitative appraisal of the 
type of administrative decision involved."302 Unfortunately, 
neither Summers nor Mashaw defined dignity other than 
through examples. Mashaw, for example, observed that the 
conflict in Mathews affected the claimants' dignity in that a 
positive decision validated the assertion that a claimant should 
be excused from being a productive member of society, and a 
negative decision grouped a claimant among society's duty 
shirkers.303 
Some sense, however, if not a definition, of the term, seems 
necessary here. A useful oversimplification of a sense of dignity is 
humanness-those special characteristics that distinguish 
humans from other creatures.304 Or perhaps more useful: 
humanness includes characteristics the denial of which would 
render an individual a lesser category of humanity. Such a view 
leaves the value somewhat subjective but sufficiently concrete 
and universal for these purposes. If the individual or the 
community sees a characteristic as necessary for full status as a 
human being, then a threat to that characteristic is a threat to 
dignity. Such a threat creates a value to be incorporated in the 
system of principles that governs the procedural design. 
Eisenberg observed one of the reasons for providing 
participatory process even when a decision is not to be made on a 
record of proof and reasoned argument: ''Where a decision will 
have a serious impact on a discrete set of persons, preservation of 
individual dignity points to the desirability of an ordering process 
in which those persons will be able to express their view of the 
matter to the decisionmaker before the decision is made."305 This 
concern is even more compelling in adjudicative decisions covered 
by procedural due process, where the decision must be based on 
"some kind" of record. Like Mashaw and Summers, Eisenberg 
301. See Summers, supra note 107, at 23 (asserting that respect for human 
dignity and fair access to legal processes are inlportant "process values"). 
302. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis added). 
303. See id. 
304. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 57 
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785) (observing that 
human beings are different from all other beings). 
305. Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 417. 
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would justify participatory opportunities in procedural design as 
those opportunities bolster dignity as a discrete value.306 
Although commentators such as Summers, Mashaw and 
Eisenberg focus on individual dignity307-the dignity of the 
individual to whom the action is directed-dignity implicates 
serious community interests as well. Immanuel Kant firmly 
established dignity in our pantheon of primary values.308 Kant's 
"dignity'' derives from moral actions: "[S]ince Kant insists it is 
not rationally conceivable that anything other than the capacity 
for practical reason could be of comparable value, the categorical 
imperative requires that human dignity should never be violated 
by treating human beings as if they were solely a means to the 
ends of others."309 That is, community members have dignity in 
the way they treat each other. In this way, dignity is as dignity 
does; individuals have dignity in the way they act towards other 
community members and not by some characteristic that is 
bestowed on them. It is through the community that individuals 
"exercise" their dignity, and hence individual dignity is 
necessarily intertwined with that of the rest of community. In no 
sense are the community's interests and individual dignity 
adverse to one another. Indeed, quite the opposite is asserted 
here: the community has a profound interest in the dignity of 
each of its members. 
Procedural design must then assure the dignity of the 
individual member. This imperative acquires its force, however, 
from the recognition that dignity is a necessary element of 
human society. In sum, whatever its other virtues, a procedural 
design should not demean those affected. 
4. Equality and Consistency. Equal treatment is a core 
component of prc;>cedural design.310 The imperative for equal 
treatment tests procedural design in addition to, and to some 
extent, in lieu of, correctness. Mashaw found that "lj]ustice in a 
306. See id. at 413-14 (affirming that participation in judicial proceedings 
increases the dignity of the proceeding). 
307. See id. (recognizing the importance of individual participation in the 
judicial process); Mashaw, supra note 1, at 49 (concurring that without individuals 
participating in the process, dignity will be lost); Summers, supra note 107, at 23 
(affirming individual dignity as a value that cannot be lost in procedural design). 
308. See KANT, supra note 304, at 42 (designating dignity as a fundamental 
value that cannot be bought or replaced). 
309. Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETillCS 262, 263 
(Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992). 
310. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 199, at 246 ("[T]he law contains a central thread 
that is absent from comparable institutions that engage in similarly complex 
decisionmaking: the value of equal treatment."). 
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formal philosophical sense is often defined as equality of 
treatment. "311 Mashaw continued: "Indeed, insofar as 
adjudicatory procedure is perceived to be adversarial and dispute 
resolving, the degree to which procedures facilitate equal 
opportunities for the adversaries to influence the decision may be 
the most important criterion by which fairness is evaluated.',s12 
Equality in procedure is often expressed in terms of 
consistency. If the process cannot assure correctness, it can at 
least assure that like cases are treated alike.313 Administrative 
law strongly favors consistency.314 Commentators have seen 
consistency as a vital check on arbitrariness.315 A study of Social 
Security decisions, for example, developed a list of characteristics 
that were shown to predict expected outcomes against which 
actual decisions could be evaluated statistically.316 The Fifth 
Circuit found that a process can be judged to have contributed to 
accuracy because of its tendency to generate the same results in 
similar cases.317 Procedural design might then be evaluated based 
on its ability to generate consistent and/or predictable outcomes 
in similar procedural categories. 
The acceptability of a process also depends on its consistency 
with similar processes throughout the greater system. For 
example, after concluding that Connecticut's prejudgment 
attachment procedure violated common law procedures for such 
actions, the Court added: "Connecticut's statute appears even 
311. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 52. 
312. ld. at 52 (footnote omitted). 
313. See Saks, supra note 199, at 246 ("The unusual difficulty of finding a 
criterion against which to test the correctness of trial outcomes and the special 
concern in the law for equal process lead to an emphasis on reliability, rather than 
validity, in evaluating the working of the law."). "[T]he law ought to strive to treat 
like cases alike (reliability) and, if possible, to make the correct decision on those 
similarly treated similar cases (validity)." ld. at 245-46 (footnote omitted). 
314. See generally 2 KOCH, supra note 1, at 255-59. 
315. Yet neither due process nor equal protection have convinced the 
government to change its position. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 
F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (positing that due process does not prevent the 
government from refusing to satisfy reasonable expectations created by past 
policies); Seven Star, Inc. v. United States, 873 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A 
claim that an administrative agency has made different decisions in different cases, 
in different years, does not give rise to a claim for relief on equal protection 
grounds."). 
316. See MAsHAW ET AL., supra note 202, at 14 ("[G]iven a relatively short list of 
characteristics of a case, a computer program can predict with a high degree of 
accuracy whether the case will be an award or a denial."). 
317. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 38 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir. 
1994) (asserting that the district court's failure to hold a sanctions hearing did not 
deny due process to the sanctioned attorney). 
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more suspect in light of current practice.'ms The Court noted that 
nearly every state provided a greater number of attachment 
procedures.319 Thus, equality of treatment of similar individuals 
among procedural systems affects the evaluation of the process. 
These individual-interest-oriented senses of equality do not 
capture the true sense of equality as a community value. Our 
community demands equality as a procedural value, but with a 
twist that disconnects individual justice from this sense of 
equality. Modern procedural jurisprudence is founded on a 
"liberalism" that concedes a plurality conception of good. This 
liberalism supposes, as Rawls expressed it, "that there are many 
conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good, each 
compatible with the full rationality of human persons, so far as 
we can ascertain within a workable political conception of 
justice.'.a2o Procedure then, if not itself value neutral, can be seen 
as absorbing disparate substantive values or principles. That is, 
conflicting and incommensurable values are given appropriate 
consideration within the decisionmaking context. This is the 
sense of equality that makes sense under modern conditions.321 
As discussed above, the incommensurability of rights is 
hotly debated and well beyond the scope of this work or its 
author.322 Here, we need to assert only that the procedural 
design system must envision a "flexible" sense of equality 
because rights might be incommensurable. Rawls may have 
offered a practical equality test under such conditions: the "veil 
of ignorance.''323 The Thibaut and Walker empirical study 
summarized: 
318. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 17 (1991). 
319. See id. 
320. Rawls, supra note 247, at 248. 
321. Cf. id. at 245. Rawls further declared: 
I d. 
[L]iberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under 
modern conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and 
incommensurable conceptions of the good .... This does not mean, of course, 
that such a conception [of justice] cannot impose constraints on individuals 
and associations, but that when it does so, these constraints are accounted 
for, directly or indirectly, by the requirements of political justice for the 
basic structure. 
322. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 88, at 1170 (explaining that incommensurability 
might be seen as "the incomparability of options or choices"). 
323. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 24 n.27 (1993). In one defense of 
the usefulness of the "veil of ignorance," a concept first propounded in Rawls's A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls observed: 
We model [a disconnection between "people's comprehensive doctrines" and 
"the content of the political conception of justice"] by putting people's 
comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance. This enable [sic] us to 
find a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping 
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[S]ubjects behind the veil adopted a perspective that led 
them to prefer (and to judge as fair) systems they 
believed to favor the disadvantaged, while tending to 
preserve equal access to channels of information and to 
mechanisms of control. The principles of fairness in legal 
procedures developed in our simulation of the original 
position therefore correspond rather well with those 
postulated by Rawls as the likely objects of agreement in 
the ideal original position.324 
699 
In sum, "equality" as a community value requires a procedural 
system biased towards the disadvantaged. 
The community's interest in equality is somewhat different 
from that of any given individual's, but no less intense. Our 
community's interest in "equality" in procedural design is to 
assure some advantage for those least able to participate without 
unduly comprormsmg the effectiveness and overall 
responsiveness of the process. This community value will add 
weight to certain procedural imperatives beyond that apparent if 
all individuals are considered literally equal in the procedural 
system. 
N. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES 
In application, as in concept, the goal is to coordinate, in 
procedural design, the community's interests with those of its 
individual members. The above factors, as points of sensitivity, 
provide a context for the coordination of these major categories of 
interests. This section suggests how these factors may be applied 
in developing individual procedural designs. Because design will 
necessarily be affected by the perspective of the designers, this 
section ends with some observations about how those perspectives 
might manifest themselves and perhaps be adjusted by this 
approach. 
A. Three Implications for Procedural Design 
A system of principles derived from the above-discussed 
factors could operate to improve due process design in three basic 
ways. First, the principles could alert designers as to the weight 
to be given to the procedural issues within the bundle of issues 
presented for resolution. Second, the system could evolve 
I d. 
consensus and thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society 
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
324. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 214, at 115. 
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categories of procedural questions in order to transfer general 
learning to particular procedural design tasks. Finally, these 
principles could affect the design by identifying the dominance of 
a particular concern that should be given priority in a particular 
procedural design. 
1. The Relative Importance of Procedural Design in 
Context. The first-level implication of the above analysis is that 
community and individual interests, previously seen as adverse, 
should be seen as supporting each other. Together, they add 
weight or velocity to the demand for procedure. That is, if 
quantitative measure were possible, this analysis would add 
rather than subtract community and individual interests. This 
combined weight can be evaluated relative to the other 
(substantive) issues presented. 
An analysis of the combined weight of the community 
interests and those of individual members will affect the 
judgment concerning the procedural question seriousness. As 
discussed above, a fundamental failing in all procedural analysis 
is the lack of objective information about the actual impact of a 
specific procedural element; nonetheless, judgments must be 
made. Designers will be informed as to the intensity of their 
concern over procedural design under current conditions of 
uncertainty about the procedure's value and effectiveness. The 
interests' combined weight will determine allocation of resources 
to the procedural aspects of the decision. Thus, for example, if the 
individual interest in the decisionmaking process is substantial, 
but the community interest is small, attention to process issues 
may be less compelling than if both the individual interest and 
the community interest are substantial. 
It is important to remember that each decision involves a 
resolution of a bundle of issues. Appropriate procedure is one 
category within that bundle. Assigning weight to the procedural 
issue tells the decisionmaker how much attention to devote to 
procedural design. The decisionmaker, for example, could 
determine that the procedural issues, when the individual and 
community interests are coordinated, are very weighty. After 
careful consideration, however, and not in disagreement with the 
above determination, the decisionmaker could still design a fairly 
informal process because such a process serves the relevant 
substantive interests of both the community and its members 
best.325 
325. The classic example is Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) ("Many 
requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with .... 
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2. Recognizing Groupings of Factors to Evolve Categories of 
Procedural Designs. The above is sort of a gross implication: the 
combined weight of the community interests and those of the 
community's members describes the importance of the procedural 
issues. The coherence, however, of these two types of interests, as 
they relate in applying the factors identified above, has a more 
subtle effect on procedural design. As has been shown above, 
each factor has implications for both the community and the 
individual, and each procedural element potentially serves both 
interests. Thus, not only will the combined weight of the two 
interests designate the procedural issues' importance in a given 
decisionmaking context, but evaluation of the coordinated 
interests will inform procedural design in a particular context. 
The task is to develop categories of procedural questions for 
which answers continue to evolve. Remembering that 
categorization is a creative and dynamic process, and that 
sometimes evolution involves the balancing of interests and the 
trade-off of the factors discussed above, a system of principles 
should emerge in which a procedural designer will understand, 
under particular conditions, that certain procedures will 
coordinate all the factors, optimizing the community interests 
and those of its individual members. Simplistically, learning will 
evolve which tells a procedural designer that where the 
particular decisionmaking undertaking faces x set of factors, the 
best procedural design will be understood to include y set of 
procedural elements. The procedural designer will be expected to 
make his or her own contribution, so that application in the 
specific case will generally contribute to the evolution of 
procedural design principles. Specific categories will capture this 
development and serve as the springboard for new applications 
and further development. 
Again, the development of this understanding is made 
difficult by the absence of objective information concerning the 
actual implications of certain procedural choices. Procedural 
designers, however, are not without tools to begin an evolution of 
a more precise procedural design system. An array of judicial 
thinking is embodied in the cases. Designers now depend on 
experience and judgment. Tradition, as an embodiment of 
experiential data, also supports the process. Legal theorists, such 
[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the 
right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, 
however informal."). See also Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 
(1981) ("[T]he State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, ... and, 
in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal 
procedures .... "). 
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as Fuller and Eisenberg, discussed above, help reason through 
judgments about the procedural goals in a particular context. 
Procedural designers, judges and officials in particular, 
would make a substantial contribution to this experiential base 
by taking more care in justifying individual procedural moves. At 
this point, it is impossible to recommend more than this: 
procedural designers should articulate the factors they find 
controlling and how they hope their procedural choices might 
improve the particular procedural design's performance. Careful 
identification of the points of sensitivity in a procedural design 
will sharpen procedural design and advance the development of 
the law.326 More to the point, efforts to coordinate, or sometimes 
to trade-off, these two categories of interests as expressed within 
the above factors will advance procedural design. As this process 
evolves, procedural designers, perhaps with the aid of better 
empirical support, will compare the mix of factors in the case 
before them with a similar category of cases. 
3. Special Concerns May Affect the Final Design. Adding 
detail to procedural design will also recognize that the dominance 
of either community interest or individual interest may affect 
procedural design. This observation recalls the form of balancing 
in which all interests survive, but some are given greater weight 
than the others. Here, however, while both interests must be 
reflected in the procedural design, one type of procedural design 
may better serve one interest than the other. The dominance of 
one interest may affect the final design, but not to the detriment 
ofthe other. 
The recognition that the two interests have separate, as well 
as combined, weight allows fine-tuning of the design. The 
procedural designer may reach certain conclusions regarding the 
general procedural mix of what best serves the coordinated 
interest of the major interests, but may also recognize that the 
design must additionally concentrate on one of the lesser interests. 
From considering the above values, the procedural designer might, 
for example, adopt a procedure that serves the community's 
interest even if it does not serve the individual's. Still, to the 
extent possible, a design weighted toward one interest should 
avoid diminishing its performance relative to the other. 
Although the principle of coherence must recognize that 
sometimes a process serving one interest will not optimize 
326. Such an articulation of the procedural design task will inform the research 
task as well as the application task. With the clear need exposed, the motivation for 
empirical study of procedure may become more obvious. 
2000] DUE PROCESS CALCULUS 703 
service to the other interest, it at least forces the procedural 
designer to recognize both categories of interests. The 
community and its individual members are in a continuous 
relationship, and the overarching goal of the design is 
coordination of community and individual interests. 
Cooperation among individuals in such a relationship optimizes 
their interests and justifies their commitment to the 
community. Moreover, as argued above, the vitality of the 
particular community that supports the particular program is 
generally of interest to the individuals affected by decisions in 
those programs. In short, procedural designers must recognize 
the coherence of interest, even if in one context the individual 
interests and community interests compete. 
For example, Fuller's participation thesis was limited to 
adjudication by the dominance of individual rights.327 As has been 
seen, however, the community has an interest in participation by 
its individual members. Fuller recognized the limitation of his 
approach, and hence invented the concept of "polycentric" 
tasks.328 To illustrate, he provides examples in which "we are 
dealing with a situation of interacting points of influence and 
therefore with a polycentric problem beyond the proper limits of 
adjudication.',a29 In these not rare circumstances, individual cases 
cannot be resolved without dealing with other "tensions." The 
individual controversy exists in the community context. The 
community and its other members cannot be excluded without 
violating principles of participation. Eisenberg adds the problem 
of "multiple criteria," criteria that cannot be confined to 
individual disputes, because, in our terms, those disputes 
necessarily implicate community values.330 Eisenberg solves the 
problem by propounding a system of degrees of "responsiveness" 
to proof and argument. In his system, then: 
[R] esponsiveness runs on a continuum from a relatively 
restrictive and constraining norm, as in classical 
adjudication, to the more diffuse norm of serving the 
public's needs that is a general aspiration of democratic 
institutions. Similarly, participation runs on a 
continuum from cases in which all persons who are 
directly affected by a decision have a right to participate 
327. See Fuller, supra note 228, at 357. 
328. See id. at 394 (defining "polycentric" tasks as multiple implications of one 
decision). 
329. Id. at 395. 
330. See Eisenberg, supra note 229, at 424 (admitting that an individual's 
problem and its subsequent resolution affect not only the individual, but also the 
community as a whole). 
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in its formulation, as in negotiation, to cases in which 
participation may occur but is not institutionally defined 
d d . I . I t· 331 an assure , as 1n egis a 1on. 
The source of dissatisfaction of these careful legal process 
observers is, in our terms, coordination of community interests 
and specific individual interests. As here, they are not contending 
that these broader interests are adverse to the resolution of the 
individual dispute; rather, they are hunting for a way to inject 
these other valid interests without diminishing the individual 
interests. These observers are, in short, trying to resolve the 
problem present here. They are not attempting to trade off these 
interests. As to individual dispute resolution, adjudication (with 
attention to both Fuller's polycentric problem and Eisenberg's 
multiple criteria), can be explained by sensitivity to the unity 
between the community interest and that of the community's 
members. Acceptance of the observation here that community 
interests are coherent with individuals members' interests allows 
the system to deal with this problem with some precision. 
Eisenberg, for example, recognizes that the "consultative" process 
of administrative rulemaking serves the community interests 
discussed above without being constrained by a rigid 
requirement of careful attention to proof and argument, or 
"strong responsiveness."332 
Due process law, somewhat more intuitively, excludes 
rulemaking from its coverage.333 This exclusion is a gross 
response to the dominance of the community interests. The 
suggested analysis allows for an adjustment in which the 
dominance of the community interest and needs of the 
community's individual members in the decisionmaking can be 
accommodated without diminishing one interest to the benefit of 
the other. Such an approach supports due process doctrine for 
rulemaking, and similar generalized participatory concepts build 
around the needs of this category of decisionmaking tasks and its 
inherent community dominance. Although the fear of 
inappropriate judicial choices cautions against this move, the 
prospect of positive gains not only for individual interests, but 
also for community values as described above, support it. 
331. Id. at 431. 
332. See id. at 415, 417 (suggesting that some participation, even if the 
decisionmaker is not bound, serves dignity and the value of a well-informed 
decision). 
333. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at§ 2.20[3]. 
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B. Perspective of the Designers 
The system of principles suggested above must ultimately be 
implemented by procedural designers. These designers should be 
guided by the need to work with the above factors toward a goal 
of so coordinating the interests of the community and its 
individual members. The factors discussed above, as they 
incorporate the two major interest categories, should help 
procedural designers think through a particular design. 
Nonetheless, the designers' perspective cannot be ignored. 
The due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution provide the foundation upon 
which judicial interpretation-especially in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century-has evolved a sophisticated procedural 
jurisprudence. There are, in addition to these foundational 
prescriptions, an array of statutory provisions that establish a 
variety of procedural designs. Among these are the generalized 
provisions of the state and federal administrative procedure acts. 
Our procedural system involves a rather complex interaction 
among these sources of procedurallaw.334 While this article has 
focused on due process jurisprudence, conceptually it can inform 
any institution engaging in procedural design-legislators and 
bureaucrats, as well as courts. 
Nonetheless, procedural design undertaken outside the 
context of an individual decision has a different focus than does a 
design evaluation as applied in a specific case. Designer 
perspective is affected by whether the design is contemplated 
before individual application, or evaluated after individual 
decisions. Thus, procedural designers may be classified as either 
ex ante (legislators and officials), or ex post (the courts). 
Procedures are prescribed before the program begins in the 
legislation (although usually very superficially), and in the 
procedural rules and pronouncements of the administrators. 
Additionally, these ex ante procedural designs are in place when 
an individual decision is made. The procedures may be evaluated 
by the courts after they are used to make the individual decision, 
and this ex post evaluation focuses on the procedures as they are 
performed in a particular context. The perspective from the two 
distinct design stages creates biases that the coordination of 
interests would uncover and perhaps mitigate. 
It is often observed that a procedural design's evaluation is 
distorted by the fact that courts, the ex post designers, have their 
334. See generally 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at ch. 2. 
706 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [37:635 
attention drawn to a very specific individual circumstance.335 This 
perspective heightens the tension between the community 
interest and the now adverse individual interest, masking their 
coordinate interests. The courts are not unmindful of the 
community interests in procedural design, but they often over-
emphasize the obvious individual interests at the expense of the 
more subtle community and nonparty individual interests. The 
system of design must inform these ex post designers regarding 
the interrelation of the factors in evaluating a process. By 
informing the ex post designers-the courts-such a system will 
increase their sensitivity to the larger context, ironically, by 
making them more sensitive to the full range of individual 
interests. 
Ex ante designers necessarily focus on both the community 
interests and those of an abstract, aggregate individual member. 
These designers may not see the context in which their broader 
task is intertwined with all individual interests. It is perhaps 
here that the recognition of the coordination of interests will 
have greater effect because these designers will focus on 
procedural design as it expresses the community's interest in its 
individual members. Indeed, the most conspicuously absent 
players in procedural design are often the legislators. Perhaps 
the above strategy will motivate these ex ante designers to 
understand that procedural design, as well as substantive 
program design, implicates community interests. 
A goal of coordinating the two major categories of interest 
may also mediate the conflict between the ex poste and ex ante 
designers. The allocation of authority over procedure between 
the legislators, administrative authorities, and the courts, 
creates a continuous tension. This tension is evident in the case 
law. In Arnett v. Kennedy, for example, the Court seemed to 
adopt a position, taking the "bitter" prescribed procedures with 
the "sweet" entitlement.336 It is, however, the ex ante 
designers-Congress, in this case-who have the dominant 
authority over procedural design, and hence their design would 
be presumed valid in a due process attack. The Arnett 
335. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 97, at 322. Nagel states: 
I d. 
[T]he importance of governmental policies is evaluated by judges with a 
kind of tunnel vision .... Any particular governmental policy can be made 
to seem unnecessary or unimportant or even senseless if it is detached from 
the institutional and social web that gives it meaning. The result is to 
systematically favor individual interests over collective interests. 
336. 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (explaining that participants must take "the bitter 
with the sweet" when procedures establishing rights are hurtful in themselves). 
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presumption has not been continued and was soundly rejected 
in Loudermill. 337 
Easterbrook asked: "If the goal of the Eldridge formula is the 
maximization of society's wealth, why did the legislature not 
enact the preferable procedures in the first place?',:l38 
Easterbrook's rhetorical question supports the ''bitter with the 
sweet" approach of Arnett in that it supports the notion that the 
courts should not impose additional procedures because the most 
cost-effective procedures are by definition provided by ex ante 
decisionmakers. Referring to the legislative judgment regarding 
these two costs, he asserted: "That they choose not to use these 
procedures is strong evidence that their costs outweigh their 
benefits."339 The justification for the bitter with the sweet doctrine 
would be more plausible in the rare situation in which there is 
some evidence that the political authorities actually attempted to 
coordinate interests. Given the general absence of care in 
procedural choices, and the undeniable judicial expertise in that 
area, courts should be active participants, even with respect to 
community interests.340 In other words, while courts must be 
active procedural designers in order to support and adjust ex 
ante procedural design decisions, they must also concern 
themselves with optimizing community, as well as individual, 
interests.341 The coherence asserted above suggests that a judicial 
failure to coordinate these interests will endanger both 
categories. 
The interaction between the ex ante and the ex post 
procedural designers will evolve procedural categories that will 
optimize the several factors as they serve both community 
interests and those of the community's individual members. 
Generally, the political institutions are thought to best define the 
community interests. In Mathews, Justice Powell accepted this 
idea in the procedural context: "In assessing what process is 
337. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1985). See 
also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, in which the Court refused to defer to the 
state legislature's judgment regarding a ban on advertising, and placed the burden 
of proof on the state to show that the restraint would further a substantial 
community interest. 517 U.S. 484, 505, 516 (1996). 
338. Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 110. 
339. Id. See also Pierce, supra note 3, at 1999 ("[L]egislatures and agencies are 
likely to do a better job of choosing appropriate procedures through application of 
the Eldridge test than courts have done."). 
340. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 920 ("Judicial restraint is not legitimately 
employed as a one-sided tool to limit rights; it must operate to limit asserted 
governmental interests as well."). 
341. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 984 ("[T]he Court must individually 
determine the governmental interest supporting each argument brought by the state 
and federal governments."). 
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due ... , substantial weight must be given to the good-faith 
judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the 
administration of. . . programs that the procedures they have 
provided assure fair consideration ... .'.a42 The courts should be 
sensitive to their shortcomings in judging relevant community 
interests even as they rely on their expertise in procedural 
design.343 
Nonetheless, the courts should be active procedural 
designers. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has inhibited this 
evolutionary process by ordering great deference to the 
procedural judgment of the ex ante procedural designers. For 
example, Vermont Yankee placed authority in the ex ante 
designers-Congress and the relevant agency-and thus gave 
their designs a presumption of validity in a case in which 
statutorily prescribed procedures are challenged.344 The allocation 
between the ex post and ex ante designers, however, is now 
unclear because of the contrast between the consistent adherence 
to Vermont Yankee (presumption favoring the ex ante design in 
statutory challenge) and Loudermill's firm rejection of the 
presumption favoring ex ante design m constitutional 
challenges. 345 
The judicial strategy should meld the courts' role with that 
of ex ante procedural designers rather than describing 
boundaries of authority. In doing so, the courts should remain 
sensitive to the legislative goals and administrative tasks. 
Although judicial expertise in procedural design is conceded, the 
recognition that procedural design carries a heavy dose of 
community values suggests a formative role for the legislators 
and officials. Indeed, under certain circumstances, courts might 
well demand that legislators resolve procedural design issues 
just as they sometimes force the legislators to resolve 
fundamental substantive policy issues. 
342. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). 
343. See Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 920 ("Judicial restraint ... requires more 
judicial awareness of the competing interests heaped on the scales. In this respect, it 
is necessary to reconsider the mandated deference to legislative judgment in the 
rational basis test .... "). 
344. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (declaring that, absent constitutional 
conflicts, government agencies should be able to make their own rules and 
procedures); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) ("A State ... has no 
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory 
classification."); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) (stating that, absent 
"constitutional constraints," Congress has the power to "prescribe rules of evidence 
and standards of proof' for the federal courts). 
345. See 1 KOCH, supra note 1, at § 2.34. 
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The Loudermill and Vermont Yankee lines of cases could do a 
better job of allocating procedural lawmaking authority. The 
allocation of authority over procedural issues rests with both the 
policymaking entities-legislators and agency officials-and the 
courts. Dominance shifts according to the institution that is best 
able to make judgments about the relevant values. While 
conceding that community and individual interests mutually 
support each other, the allocation of authority may depend on the 
respective weight of the two interests. Often a legislature or 
administrative entity will be in a better position to design 
procedures that respond to these values than are the courts. 
Courts should give such procedures more deference if they are 
based on a coordination of the community and individual 
interests. 
Thus, interaction between the ex ante and ex post 
procedural designers should evolve procedural design categories. 
These categories will incorporate the points of sensitivity 
explored above. Through this process, the procedural designers 
will utilize and improve a range of procedural designs. 
